Blogs are in chronological order

January 6:  Welcome to 2006!  I'll still be blogging infrequently (perhaps never) until Jan. 17, then the pace will pick up.  This break is taken up with joy over the arrival of Dana Christopher Erb, born December 27, 2005 at 4:27 PM, in Augusta, Maine!  He's healthy, happy, and brother Ryan is slowly adjusting.

The news, of course, is full of potential dynamite, all of which I'll write more about when the new semester begins in a week and a half.  A few things to look for:
    a) Iraq:  The elections in December were another "tipping point" that wasn't.  Violence remains high, and in fact the chance of private militias taking over security means we're heading closer to sectarian civil war, and farther from the ideal of a democratic state.   But I think needs to be explored is how some people really have this whole issue fundamentally wrong.  This isn't come kind of long term war with Islamic extremism, not some major world conflict which threatens the West.  The paranoid delusions of some about the fall of the West and the lack of will to confront a true threat are simply not grounded in reality, but irrational fear.  In coming blogs, I'll explain why and lay out what now is becoming an increasingly clear idea of where the Iraq conflict is heading;
    b) Tangentopoli:  The Abramoff corruption scandal which could hit as many as 60 or more Congresspeople from both parties could be the biggest story of the year.  I used the term tangentopoli to allude the similar corruption scandals in Italy that brought down the Italian "first republic" and destroyed the careers of top political leaders.  I don't know if this will that far, but it could be the biggest scandal in a long time for the US, and if it is, Congress and our political system will be reeling.  Some see it in partisan terms, but it's always good when Congress gets the message that corruption doesn't pay.  Corruption is a destroyer of political stability (Iraq's high corruption is perhaps a worse long term sign than its insurgency), and it needs to be nipped in the bud.
    c) The economy:  Is it good or bad?  Is housing crashing or set to take off again?  Is Europe ready to eclipse the US, or the Europeans has been?  What about China?  These issues will become really salient in 2006, perhaps moreso than most people realize.

So that's what we have to look forward to.  More later!

January 17:  The new semester is underway!  Some fun courses this semester; I'm again co-teaching the course on Children and War with Mellisa Clawson (Early Childhood Education), and co-teaching a course "1900-1910: The First Modern Decade" with Steve Pane (Music) and Sarah Maline (Art History).  And, of course, American Foreign policy is a topical course...let the fun begin!

An event last week shows starkly the problem in America's current "war on terror": the way we are fighting it, we cannot win.  In an attempt to kill the number two man in al qaeda  Ayman al-Zawahiri, the US bombed a house where a feast for a Muslim holiday was taking place, with women and children amongst the dead.  The result has been a wave of protests around Pakistan which threaten the stability of the government of President Pervez Musharraf.  Musharraf rules over some of the most extreme anti-American radicals, yet has sided with the US in the fight against al qaeda.  This has weakened him politically, and the protests against the attack which killed civilians is immense, driving even some of his allies to question his ability to rule effectively.

Americans may see no problem in hitting a house and killing women and children if there is a chance an anti-American terrorist mastermind is there.  But Pakistanis see that as an attack on their sovereignty; how would we like it if suddenly China bombed a house in California killing civilians because a Chinese terrorist might have been there?  If Pakistan becomes unstable (and, by the way, they already have a nuclear weapon), this could threaten the very foundation of America's tactics in Afghanistan.  This also makes it harder to get cooperation in finding Osama or Zawahiri, and pushes more and more young people towards radical Islam, helping terrorists recruit.  Even if we did "get" some terrorists with the attack, we certainly helped them recruit a lot of new ones.

Moreover, the attack wouldn't have been worth it even had it been successful.  Al-Zawahiri may be number 2, but get rid of him, and there will be a new number two ready to take his place.  Al qaeda is decentralized, and Islamic extremism is even more multi-faceted.  The idea that somehow you can take out a few leaders and make more than a short term difference is misguided.   And while we don't see many of these stories, the Muslim world sees reports daily of civilians killed in Iraq or elsewhere by the US, and anger and anti-Americanism is enhanced.

The core issue is not whether or not we should "fight terror," but rather HOW to do it, and what it even means to talk about the metaphor of war against terrorism, which is a strategy, not an enemy.  Right now the US is engaged in counter productive policies because that is all we are equipped to do at this time.  We can't increase military action because we lack the military personnel, public support, and allies.  We can't withdraw because the Bush Administration would see that as a sign of defeat.  Thus with limited power we try to knock off bigwigs which might generate an ability to claim success and progress "against terror," or we engage in small operations to stabilize regions (only to have extremists come back once we are gone).  Afghanistan has become unstable and dangerous just about everywhere, and many believe an Iraqi style insurgency is growing there.  The Taliban is in control of some parts of the country, strengthening rather than weakening.

So what we're doing isn't working.  Moreover, these tactics not only can't win, but hurt the US in the long run by helping stir up visions of a culture war or a conflict against outside aggressors who supposedly "hate Islam."   In fact, if democracy were to come to the Arab world, the people elected would almost certainly be much more anti-American than the authoritarians currently in power.   We are fighting with a strategy doomed to failure. 

So what should we do?  That will be the subject of a blog later this week.

January 20:  What a week!  I had planned to write first about the Iraq war and how that situation might be improved, using "backward planning" for the desired result -- a consociational form of democracy.  I'll probably get to that next week.  I was going to save the harder issue (and one that will cover a few blog entries as I get just small chunks of time during the day to write) until last, but the release of Bin Laden's warning and "truce offer" to the US moves that issue up front.

If al qaeda can strike in the US -- and Bin Laden speaking out after a year of silence suggests he was saving himself for a credible warning -- then it's a sign that the Iraq war and indeed US actions in the Mideast have done nothing to make the country safer from terrorism, and the policies since 9-11 have failed.  This would verify recent comments by the 9-11 commission that gave the US low marks on homeland security, and lend more credence to arguments such as mine that our policies actually aid the terrorists by helping them recruit, distracting vast amount of American resources to Iraq, where most insurgents are not Islamic extremists but Sunnis trying to fight Shi'ites, and call into question (after the initial bout of fear and nationalism) the very nature of our response to this challenge.

There's also a little subplot here that's rather interesting, and puts Iran's foreign policy in a different light.  Consider: In the Islamic world American influence and popularity are at an all time low.  Governments that support the US, such as Pakistan, Egypt,  and Saudi Arabia, are in defiance of public opinion in their own country.  Moreover, even with repressive tactics, these governments are not wholly secure.  Extremists of various sorts see opportunity around the corner -- the opportunity to lead the cause of radical Islam against western influence.  Iran donned that mantel in the 1980s, and the US even supported Saddam to try to contain Iranian fundamentalism.  As Iran watches the US flail about in Iraq, and insurgent/extremist groups strengthen, it realizes that al qaeda or Bin Laden could challenge them for that role.  This would be a threat because they believe revolutionary Islam should be Shi'ite, while groups like al qaeda are Sunni.  Iran is upping stakes perhaps in part to compete against radical Sunnis for the crown of who represents the cause of radical Islam.  Iran or Al qaeda?  Sunni or Shi'ite?

Suppose Israel or the US bombs sites in Iran.  It might slow down the development of a nuclear weapon, but maybe not.  Iranian hardliners might even consider a nuclear weapon an unnecessary luxury; more important would be to use such an event to enrage the Muslim world and try to claim a role in leading its reaction.   The Iranians are not like Saddam, they won't likely suddenly start a major war, they'd play the victim and try to gather sympathy and rage on their side against the hated Americans and Israelis.  Meanwhile, al qaeda would be pressured to up the ante to prove they are the dominant defender of "true" Islam.   Remember, their emphasis is over there, not over here.  Al qaeda strikes the US to affect politics in the Mideast, not out of a desire to somehow 'conquer' America or because he has an irrational desire to "kill us."  It's strategic, it's an attempt to build support over there, and pressure not only the West, but especially pro-western authoritarian governments like those of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

I suspect they don't feel all that threatened by the US.  Iran is wooing Iraqi Shi'ites who already have made expressions of friendship to Iran (and many of whom lived there in exile during the Saddam years).  Iran also knows it could, if it wanted to, really disrupt the US in Iraq if it supported a Shi'ite insurgency to go alongside the Sunni one.  So far it hasn't, but there is evidence it's been arming Shi'ite groups and setting the ground work for such an effort.  Al qaeda got a reprieve from the US when we shifted almost all our expertise and people power to Iraq.  Slowly the Taliban and al qaeda have been rebuilding operations in Afghanistan, and if anything violence there is racheting up.  Al qaeda has had time to adapt as well, they have always been a patient organization.

So, a strategy for effective counter-terrorism requires a major shift in focus.  Ironically, one positive thing about the US presence in Iraq is it does give the US a kind of entry into dialogue with both Sunni and Shi'ite groups, on the front line of that divide.  While I don't think that is important enough to have made the war worthwhile, it is something that is potentially useful.  Overall, however, the US has to reconcile itself to the fact that the dream of spreading democracy and changing the Mideast is over for now.  Democracies in the Arab world would certainly produce radical anti-American governments.  Rather, the goal has to shift from an idealistic desire to change the world to a more realist desire to maintain stability and contain Islamic extremism.  Despite the threat of terrorism, the conflict within Islam is the focal point; they oppose the West because of our involvement in the region, not out of a desire to eliminate the West.   A radical shift in diplomacy and policy is required.  Alongside that, counter-terrorism tactics need to be reconsidered as well.  Rather than try to smart bomb suspected bigwigs, we need to recognize you can't defeat a strategy with military force.  The emphasis has to be on prevention and disruption.

More on all of that next week -- this is enough for today!

January 24:  I'm still falling behind my desire to give my analysis of the strategic change needed in Iraq and in general the so-called "war on terror," but a variety of things conspire to keep me far too busy this week, so I'll just do a short blog entry just to show I haven't forgotten!  Reports in the media are that the reconstruction effort in Iraq is in complete turmoil due to the insurgency, further evidence that the current strategy is not working.   Judge Samuel Alito was approved by the Senate Judiciary committee on a 10-8 vote along party lines.  I agree that his deference to executive power (or apparent deference) is troubling, but I don't see any reason not to approve him to the Court.  He seems very qualified.  But I've gone on a little rant before about how I dislike the politicization of the judiciary, so I'll not repeat myself.  Instead, I'll talk about a discussion we had in class Tuesday afternoon that I've been thinking about.

In the "Children and War" class last Thursday we had an interesting discussion about supporting the troops.  Almost everyone seemed to oppose the war but supported the troops.  Their argument was consistent, but I'm struggling with what that phrase means.  The argument was not that just the American troops should be supported because they are "our" troops, but that soldiers in general are victims of political conflict and competition, and that ALL troops should be supported, even those of the enemy (unless they cross a line and commit atrocities).  They pointed out that the aggressive and sometimes dishonest tactics of military recruiters paint a picture that can be confusing to a senior in high school, and while many volunteer for the military, they really don't comprehend what they are getting themselves into.  Therefore, even volunteers are victims.  In a humanist sense you should support all who are in that position because they are going through hell and need support, potentially even soldiers of evil regimes (again, assuming they are not committing atrocities themselves). 

But "support the troops"?  I find it a weird phrase.  I don't support what they are doing, I certainly don't see the war in Iraq as defending America or freedom.   I think in fact a lot of death and suffering is coming about as a result of American policy.  Yet I agree that they are in a horrid position and many truly believe they are doing good.  I think in that sense we need to do the right social things for them -- education, health care, and acceptance into society (no calling them 'baby killer' or spitting on them!)   We also need to treat enemy troops well; such humanism has to be universal and not nationalist.  That's a kind of support, but not the kind that seems suggested in 'support the troops.'  And, though I understand the students' point, we all do have responsibility for our actions.  There are consequences for suddenly deciding not to participate in a military you signed up for, but they still do make the choice to continue.   

So I'll be politically incorrect.  I feel sorry for the troops having their lives disrupted and put in peril, I hope they come home healthy, and are treated well.  If a student has to leave because he or she is deployed in the middle of the semester, I'll bend over backwards to either help them finish the coursework early, or do alternate assignments so their deployment doesn't negatively impact their education (I've done that).  If they believe they were doing a noble deed, I'll treat them and their belief with respect.  But "support the troops"?  No, that cliché doesn't work for me.

January 25: Today is another hectic day, so it'll be a short entry. 

A Pentagon study verifies what I've suspected for some time: the Iraq war is stretching the US military to the breaking point: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060124/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/army_breaking_point

This suggests that reductions in troop levels are not due to "Iraqis stepping up," but the inability of the US to maintain a force level that already is too small to bring stability to Iraq.  This also, of course, is known by countries like Iran, Syria and North Korea who realize that despite being the world's superpower with half the world's military budget, the US through its actions in Iraq has essentially made itself a paper tiger, at least in the near term.   This also explains why military experts like Rep. Murtha, who has close connections with top brass in the Pentagon, has come out so strongly against the war in Iraq: it is severely damaging America's ability to act in the world, and is achieving no good end.  Even if getting rid of Saddam was worth it, that was done by April 2003.  More proof than ever that this strategy is failing, and a new one is needed.  More on that later...

January 27: The victory of Hamas in the Palestinian election is of course the big issue today, but I'll save it for the end of this entry.  I want to start to address the issue of a new strategy for Iraq/counter-terrorism.

In order to determine the proper way to turn around a failing strategy in Iraq and overall in the war on terror, we’ll start with good news: things aren’t as bad as it seems.  In fact, I’d go so far as to say that the worst thing we have going for us is our policy, but the environment is actually promising.  To be blunt: none of the enemies the US is fighting against are in a position to win (whatever victory might be). 

Consider Iraq.  Most of the Sunni insurgency is not so much angry at the US as they are worried about Shi’ite dominance.  Indeed, many Sunnis are trying to use the US to somehow chip away at Shi’ite power.  The Sunnis are by no means a necessary enemy for the US, their insurgency is not at base anti-American.  Moreover, there are stark splits between Iraqi nationalist Sunnis and Islamic extremists, or “foreign fighters” in Iraq.  Those foreign fighters – true anti-western Islamists – are less than 5% of the Iraqi insurgents, though they are amongst the most organized.  These foreign fighters are ultimately outsiders, tolerated only because they serve to weaken the Shi’ite government and the US.  In some ways the biggest problem the US faces in Iraq is its ally, the Iraqi government.  That government is close to Iran, desires an Islamic state, does not want to dance to Washington’s tune, but supports the US because we do a lot of its dirty work to solidify their hold on power – things they aren’t organized enough to do themselves.

Iraq needs to work towards a consociational government whereby the Kurds, Sunnis and Shi’ites agree on power and wealth sharing that is mutually beneficial, and which addresses the primary interests of each.  That will not happen as long as the US is there with a massive military presence, or if our bombing runs are numerous. 

Consider al qaeda: While I’m not as convinced as some that the tape released by Bin Laden was a sign of weakness and desperation (those motives are applied all too often to ones’ enemies, usually as a way to dismiss something troubling), al qaeda is not a monolith.  In Afghanistan there are reports of rifts between various factions of al qaeda and the Taliban, and it’s plausible that the organization is hampered as much by internal disarray as by coalition military power.   Moreover – and this is a crucial point – Islamic extremism is not and never was the majority view in the Arab and Muslim worlds.  Without the emotion of an outside invader invigorating and motivating the youth, few really want the kind of lifestyle and rule that Islamic extremists promise.

Consider terrorism, the supposed reason we're in this mess in the first place.  The attacks of 9-11, as I noted in my blog on September 27, were not that damaging in real terms to the US.  We've killed far more innocents and destroyed much more property in the last few years than that.  While one can imagine worst case scenarios of nuclear terrorism or biological weapons, the probability that a terrorist act can do real, serious, long term damage to the US is low, at least in the short term (though it rises potentially in the middle to long term if the proper policies aren't undertaken).  Terrorism relies on the response it generates, a response based on fear.  9-11 provoked the US into actions that have become counter-productive, and hide the reality that the situation is not as bad as those who say "we're at war!" would assert.  In short, we were duped to both weaken ourselves (such as the article cited last blog about the overstretched army), build large budget deficits, and enter the Islamic world as an outside invader, helping the extremists try to secure the 'culture war' they desire.

In that light we also have to look at Israel, and the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority elections.   By all accounts I've seen, two factors are paramount in causing the surprise landslide victory which has shocked the world.  One is the corruption of the old guard, going back to Yasser Arafat himself.  Corruption is blatant, open, and the people are sick of it.  Many said they don't agree with Hamas radicalism, but they had to vote for a change.  In a sense, a lot of votes were protest votes against the old guard.  Second, Israeli policy has been harsh, rousing anger and making the PA look powerless.  These two things combined to form the perfect storm and bring a terrorist organization into power.  Israel dominates the Palestinian territories; it can invade at will, launch precision strikes, and choke the economy.  Yet it has not been able to stop the threats.  That's because this isn't something that military power alone can solve, it requires a political solution.

The US is learning a similar lesson in Iraq.  Our presence there helps motivate anti-Americanism, and no matter how strong we are, we cannot win because its not a "war" in any traditional sense.

But there is opportunity here as well.  Hamas will be under pressure to perform.  As a governing body, they'll be dealing with real every day issues, not just wild anti-western anti-Israeli rhetoric.  The public will hold them accountable.  Hamas was never going to disarm or be disarmed as the Israelis demanded; they were too powerful (and, as we see, too popular).  They won't go away, and thus were an intractable roadblock to peace.  But in government they may find themselves slowly coopted into accepting the kind of compromises Arafat and the former PLO had to accept.  That will be the only way to meet the demands of the people.  If that happens, and if they avoid becoming corrupt in the same way the old guard was, then perhaps their victory was actually a necessary event for the building of a future peace.

The Mideast is at a turning point.  Choices made in coming years can determine if we'll drift towards long term instability and unrest, or if the first few years of the 21st century will some day be remembered as the dark before the dawn.