August 1, 2006 - The Islamic reformation?

Talk to someone who is an anti-Muslim bigot, and they'll go on and on talking about how ruthless Muhammad was, they will quote the sword verses of the Koran, note the battles fought in Islam's early days, and conclude that it is a violent, horrible religion, as opposed to the 'judeo-christian' values of the West.  And, since most people don't really have much knowledge about Islam, many get sucked in by that kind of utterly dishonest propaganda.

Muhammad was a reformer, who championed help for the poor, better treatment of women, an end to the Arab tribalism and pantheism, religious tolerance, and what he claimed was a correction to Christianity (the Bible was accepted as holy, Jesus considered a prophet born of a virgin -- but the deity of Jesus and the notion of the trinity were rejected).   He condemned wars of aggression, and local tribes, especially the Meccans, tried to destroy the emerging faith.  His approach threatened tribal authority and the elite of his day.  The Koran embraces diversity world wide, and given the era in which he lived, Muhammad espoused a very enlightened perspective.

So what happened?  Like all religions (including Christianity) beautiful ideas can be used to justify violence, bigotry and evil.  Even a group calling itself "God hates fags" which protests at military funerals claims to be a Christian group.  And those sword verses, apparently commanding death to all non-believers?  These are taken out of context by both Muslim extremists and anti-Islam bigots who conveniently ignore the verses after them which make clear that they are either about specific enemies (like the Meccans) in a particular case, and which say that if the enemies ask forgiveness and follow the law, then to spare them.  In fact, the Koran is clear in saying that Allah forbids going to war against an enemy who truly wants peace.  Jihad is primarily the fight of faith, to maintain ones' devotion to God despite the temptations of this life.  A military jihad (or lesser jihad) has strict rules which appear very much like the western tradition of just war theory.

In that era, Islam was a force to unite warring tribes, to force (through the zakat) better treatment of the poor, and to improve the status of women who were treated as property with no rights in marriage and divorce.  It was a pre-modern enlightened reformist faith, which compared to the violence and backwardness of Christian Europe, brought Arabia to the pinnacle of civilization, rivaling only the Chinese in terms of learning, tolerance, and quality of life.  Christians and Jews were to be allowed to practice their faiths, as long as they paid a head tax.  And, while this made them second class citizens, unacceptable by today's standards, that was the era when battles in Europe against non-Christians led to the people either being baptized or butchered.  It was extremely tolerant for that era.

Islam should have modernized first, it should have led the way to an enlightenment, it was set to do so.  But ultimately a mix of power hungry leaders and fear of attack from either the crusades or the Asians led to a military dictatorship that used the faith to claim legitimacy, but ultimately pushed aside it's enlightened roots.  Islam never completely overcame the cultural roots of tribalism which Muhammad tried to change.

Now Islam is the second largest faith in the world, and if Samuel Huntington is to be believed, may soon be number one.  The extremists within Islam want a culture war.  They have a strict, puritanical faith, a kind that has gone out of style (but once was very much in style) in Christianity.  They see modernism and its changes as a threat, and view western penetration of the Islamic world as an attack on their identity and values.  To the extent that those in the West want to turn this into a war, fantasize about 'world war III' or attack Islam as somehow inferior, they not only play into the hands of the extremists, but miss out on an opportunity. 

If one works to understand Islam, to have dialogue with Muslim clerics and religious leaders -- including, I would argue, Khameini of Iran -- then there is an opportunity to build on the shared values of the Koran and Judeo-Christian faiths to reach understandings and help bring out not only a more peaceful relationship, but to allow non-extremist Muslims reclaim the legacy of early Islam and its effort to reform, unify, and bring moral and ethical standards to what was a fierce tribal warring culture.

I have just started a book which may, by the time I finish it, alter my view somewhat.  It's called No God but God by Reza Aslan, and I'm about thirty pages into it.  He claims, though, that an Islamic reformation is taking place, and that seems a very apt description.  The reformation in Europe included wars, heresies, and no clear direction for the future of the Christian world.  Yet it was an internal affair, not one where outside powers intervened dramatically -- if they had, no doubt a more militant or radical Christianity may have arisen.  If one wants a culture war, the west will lose.  The nature of what such a war would be like is not one we are prepared to win.  Loss wouldn't mean being occupied or destroyed, but rather a severe deterioration in our standards of living.  But if we're smart, and recognize that we need to understand the cultural importance of all that is happening, and not fall into an "Islam bad West good" mentality, there is still considerable hope.

r

 August 2, 2006 - The Sistani factor  

Ayatollah Sistani called last week for an immediate cease fire in Lebanon, and harshly condemned Israeli actions, particularly the bombing of Qana.  This is important to the US because as American force levels in Iraq rise in response to ever increasing violence (remember all those 'turning point' optimists who said that once a government formed things would get better -- wrong again), Sistani has been the primary force in helping assure that Shi'ite rage against Sunnis and Americans does not go out of control.

The US is wading into a difficult political situation.  The Shi'ia are not a uniform block; Sistani generally opposes Khomeinist ideals which drive Iranian policy and Hezbollah, and true to that view has tried to limit political statements to times when they are absolutely necessary.  He generally wants a stable, democratic Iraq because that would likely assure Shi'ia dominance and, at the very least, make it impossible for the Sunnis to again exercise completely control.  To the extent the US safeguards a move to a Shi'ia dominated democratic system, Sistani stays on the sidelines.  This is endangered when the US tries to control Iraqi politics or side with the Sunnis.  Now with the emotional war in Lebanon raging, with no end in sight -- and Shi'ia being the primary victims -- Sistani cannot stand idly by.

Iran, of course, is not standing idly by, nor are various Shi'ia politicians less conservative than Sistani (by conservative I mean not radical or extremist).  Muqtada al Sadr has already made threats to send fighters to Lebanon (threats he really can't carry out), and Iraqi politicians have been vociferous in their condemnation of Israel.

The obvious bind for the US is how to handle it when the Iraqi government we so praise and support comes out strongly against American foreign policy in the Mideast, refusing to condemn Hezbollah and, in fact, condemning Israel.  The curt answer is "they are a sovereign state, they can have their own positions."  OK.  In other words, simply shrug and ignore it.  But the impact on Iraqi society, the prospects for stability, and American goals in Iraq may be profound.  Sistani symbolizes the problem.

Originally, many Americans were dismayed by Iraq's Islamic constitution, believing that unless we paved the way for a true western democracy, the operation wouldn't be worth it.  Given how women are being treated in the modern Iraq -- worse than under Saddam -- one can understand that argument.  But the reality was that the Iraqi people get to choose their style of governance, not the US.  Sistani's form of Islamism was tolerable to the United States because he hates the Iranian model, disagreeing fiercely with the Khomeinist support of theocracy, and that he wanted stability and peace.   Yet while his religious authority is immense, he is not without rivals.  al-Sadr is the most well known, and he has created a 'state within a state' in Iraq, gaining a loyal following and intense support.  Gone are the days when the US wanted him dead or alive, he proved able to stare the Americans in the eye and come out on top.  The public in general, angered by the continuing violence and insecurity, has soured on their government, and has become intensely anti-American.  Militias do more than the police to provide security in much of the country.  Add the Israeli-Lebanese war, Iran's growing influence in Iraq, and all the anger/emotion by the violence throughout the region, and things could disintegrate rapidly.

Israel apparently wants to try to establish a buffer zone or at least a presence in the area in Lebanon between the Latini river and the Israeli-Lebanese border, a distance of about 20 kilometers.  The time it would take to do that could be weeks.  All that time, Hezbollah will focus on political efforts to anger the Arab world, and to connect Israel with the US (something easy to do, especially when the Jerusalem Post reports that the US wants Israel to consider attacking Syria).   The Iraqi Shi'ite community may turn from being passively opposed to the US presence, to creating its own broad insurgency, aided by Iran.  The Sunni insurgency has been successful despite being a small percentage of the population countered by over 130,000 American troops and the majority Shi'ites (and Kurds) in opposition.  But if the Shi'ites turn against the US, American troops might be forced to retreat, and even the heavily fortified bases could be subject to terrorist attacks like the bombings in Lebanon in the eighties (most famously the 1983 barracks bombing). 

Ayatollah Sistani's moral authority is perhaps the most important factor standing in the way of things going from bad to worse in Iraq.  He has to balance his condemnation of Israel with realism on the nature of the American occupation in Iraq, and the effort to build a stable, functioning government.   Iran, of course, can play its cards and push those groups close to it to become active insurgents if US pressure on Iran increases, or if Iran is attacked by either the US or Israel.   The longer the conflict in Lebanon continues, and the more anger that is generated at Israel and the US, the more difficult Sistani's task will be, and he may be tempted to either shift his position to one unfriendly to the US, or be outflanked by his more radical rivals.

Who'd have thought that America would need to count on the support and success of a bearded, conservative, Islamic cleric?

August 3, 2006 - The Danger of putting soldiers first (why Israel and America are losing the propaganda war)

If you study the ethics of warfare, especially the just war theory tradition, there is a premium placed on protecting the lives of the non-combatants.  Original just war theory said that innocents must have their lives 'guaranteed.'  When that proved impractical, causing the Spanish conquistadors to rationalize mass murder by considering all non-Christians as combatants, the theory was amended to allow for collateral damage.  That term, now seen as a distasteful euphemism, actually emerged as a doctrine to protect civilians from massacre.

The bottom line is that even to this day, it is far better that a combatant die than a civilian.  If you follow the ethics, the death of an Iraqi civilian, or an innocent Lebanese civilian, is a far greater tragedy than the death of an American or Israeli soldier.  Soldiers should go the extra distance to put themselves in danger rather than take an innocent life.  That's not always an easy call -- clearly just shooting civilians because they "might" be a threat is wrong, but as with law enforcement officials, at times you may judge wrong. 

In America's recent wars, as well as the current Israeli war (at least how it's been fought so far), that ethical principle has been stood upside down.  The lives of the soldiers are prized, and we consciously and as a policy accept large numbers of civilian casualties in order to protect soldiers' lives.  The reason is obvious: Americans don't care about dead Iraqis -- that's just a number.  Dead GI's, however, are counted up, reported, and constantly used by those who oppose the war.   In Kosovo President Clinton (and other NATO leaders) were so scared of dead soldiers coming home in body bags that they bombed the Serbs for over 70 days, butchering many civilians, including children and innocents living far in the north of the country.  Moreover in Kosovo proper, they flew above 15,000 to be safe from anti-aircraft fire -- too high to be effective against the Serb paramilitaries.  The result: NATO couldn't help the civilians, a lot of Serbs were dead, but not one dead American.  Ultimately the Serbs gave in, but the desire to save military lives meant a lot of innocents died.

In Iraq the US fear of insurgents leads to a focus on keeping the soldiers safe over providing security.  During the military part of the war, as well as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq '91, the focus on air power was intense, again minimizing military deaths.  In the first three weeks of the Israeli-Lebanon war, Israel emphasized air power in fear of what Hezbollah could do on the ground (though this may be changing).

The twin dangers of this strategy is first that it is not as effective as people imagine, and second it creates a backlash that strengthens the enemy and shapes world opinion.

Israel's case is telling: the world was quite sympathetic when the conflict broke out, and if Israel had focused on attacking Hezbollah by going in to southern Lebanon, not only would they have been more effective, but they would not have gotten the criticism they've received.  The calls for cease fires and the anger at Israel is because of the air power and civilian deaths, all in a vein effort to stop the rockets (over 200 were fired into Israel yesterday, smashing the old "record") and weaken Hezbollah.  Hezbollah was seen as winning due in large part to the Israeli tactics -- even though Israel has only lost a handful of soldiers.  Now it appears they are changing tactics somewhat -- at least going after Hezbollah directly, though the air assault continues, but they've had a strategic disaster up until this point.

The temptation is great for a major power to use its technology to keep its people safe, and try to avoid a loss of support for a war at home.  Yet it is unethical, in that it essentially protects the combatants by risking the civilians.    Soldiers have chosen to be there; they volunteered for the army, and they could refuse to serve if they ended up not supporting a war -- they'd serve in jail, but it would be the honorable thing to do if they truly thought a war immoral.  The innocents have neither chosen this nor, in the case of children, could choose it.  Moreover the damage done to the culture is immense, and helps create a cycle that will lead to future violence.  Most politicians don't think about long term cultural impacts -- they're worried about money and elections -- but the anger caused by this level of destructions all but assures that the problems will continue and in fact multiply.

Moving back to Iraq, a report out yesterday claims that it is almost certain that the Haditha deaths were the result of murder by American soldiers.  This creates anger and hostility.  Yet for a lot of Iraqis or anyone caught in a war zone, the anger is just as intense when the killing isn't from soldiers who crack and go on a murder spree, but from high tech bombs that either go astray or sent to the wrong target.  That is something we have to come to grips with.  Haditha like incidents will occur in just about every war, but at least there we are standing on the principle that soldiers who violate protection of innocents should be punished.  We do not have the same standard when it comes to rockets and high tech weaponry, in these cases we believe we can hide behind the fact we didn't intend civilians to die -- though we know many will.

Putting the protection of innocents above the protection of soldiers means a lot more military deaths.  That means the choice to go to war would be politically more difficult -- the effort to have a war with minimal pain at home would be sacrificed.   This would, however, make it more likely  that we see the costs of war in real terms, and that we don't taint ourselves with carnage done to innocents in order to protect the political butt of any given President.    That may be politically expedient, but the damage it does to our reputation, and in terms of the very important 'propaganda war' is considerable. 

August 4, 2006 - Anti-Americanism in Iraq

Yikes!  The stories about the massive demonstrations -- numbers range from tens of thousands to over a hundred thousand -- in Iraq are alarming.  Not only are they condemning Israeli tactics against Hezbollah, but they are shouting "death to America," burning American and Israeli flags, and show an anger that could be very damaging to America's capacity to do much of anything in Iraq.

This aids radicals like Muqtada al-Sadr, and reports grow that the insurgency in Iraq is finding it ever easier to draw recruits, and there's a fear sectarian militias may decide to put their civil war aside a bit in order to try to hit the US.  All of this is unclear, but the Israeli-Lebanon war may make it impossible for even the "true believers" of the invasion of Iraq to avoid calling for withdrawal.  Meanwhile, Republican Senator Chuck Hagel, an expert on defense and foreign policy issues, has called for the US to begin withdrawing troops in six months.  And, while the militarist right is having fantasies about war spreading to Iran and Syria, the reality is the US military is overwhelmed just in an already occupied Iraq.  A report last week from defense experts (including former Secretary of Defense Perry) notes how alarmingly overstretched the military is, with no real excess capacity for action should other crises emerge.

I don't have time to write much today, but for all my critiques and criticisms of the policy of invading and occupying Iraq, I really never thought it would get this bad!  Meanwhile, the Israeli-Lebanese war heats up as missiles fall deeper into Israel (about 80 kilometers from the border) and Israeli missiles and planes expand infrastructure damage, making it increasingly difficult for any humanitarian aid to get through.  As we go into what promises (at least in Maine) to be an absolutely beautiful weekend, the news from the Mideast keeps getting worse at all levels.

August 5, 2006 - Indefensible

The war in Lebanon is an example of precisely the kind of inhumane and abstract thinking that defines how we approach war.  It is a self-defeating and immoral approach to the problems we face.

Israeli policy makes sense in an abstract way: they are being attacked from Lebanon, the government in Lebanon is unable to assure security, Hezbollah hides amongst civilians (making any attack anywhere in Lebanon justifiable since Israel can say they didn't mean to kill civilians -- a very convenient moral whitewash), and so to deter Israel must hit so hard that Hezbollah and its sponsors don't dare hit Israel again.  This requires a massive and effective response; Israel cannot afford to lose, it must do whatever is necessary to assure Hezbollah is severely damaged, otherwise the goal will not be achieved and Israel will be in more danger.  Never mind that the Hezbollah incursion into Israel was small (eight dead, two captured), it "makes sense" to destroy an infrastructure, kill large numbers of civilians, smash cities...all justified by claims of defense.

When civilian deaths are pointed out, Hezbollah is blamed.  Western commentators note that we value life and take greater precautions, trying to use precision weapons, but it's the 'nature of the enemy' that leads to results.  We have to be hard nosed and logical, realizing as heart wrenching as the photos and interviews might be, it's the reality of war, what's needed to be done to defeat the enemy.  The argument is similar to the neo-conservative argument about abstract 'spreading democracy' and 'getting rid of evil dictators,' an effort to posit a great good as a result of war, with the basic goal elimination of evil -- completely ignoring the death and destruction this means for large numbers of innocents. 

The irony is -- and irony is perhaps too bland a word -- the acts that are being justified by this apparent well intended abstractly justified conflict are themselves evil -- as evil as sending rockets into Israel, as evil in fact as a suicide bomber going into a civilian area and blowing themselves up.

The other side has abstract, rational arguments justifying their approach too.  They  claim they would like a true military confrontation with Israel, but cannot -- due to American support of Israel and Israeli power, a military on military fight would lead to the demolition of Hezbollah forces, much like how the Iraqi army was decimated in 2003.  Thus, given that they are convinced they are fighting for justice and against oppression, they need a strategy that works, they need to use whatever they can to try to find a way to weaken or defeat what they consider an evil opponent.  And this means asymmetrical warfare, tactics we label 'terrorist' and even suicide bombing -- as one author put it in a book title, "Dying to Win" (I haven't read it yet but plan to: Dying to win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism by Robert Pape).  Their logic is as convincing as ours, their moral claims rooted in a logic of 'doing what it takes' to fight oppression, and focusing on the civilian deaths caused by Israel (or the US), far outweighing the civilian damage they do.  And if you follow their logic, and are honest, you have to conclude that their arguments are as convincing as the Israeli or American arguments.  After all, if the Soviets had occupied the US, and we were put under communist tyranny, wouldn't we celebrate those Americans who would sacrifice themselves in whatever way they could to somehow weaken that oppression?

This is war between two military forces, it's not a legitimate state simply trying to combat terror.  It involves acts of evil pitted against acts of evil.  Both sides rationalize what they are doing and consider themselves just and morally superior.  Each side scoffs at the claims of morality of the other side.  "How can anyone justify suicide bombing?"   Or "look at the dead children from Israeli missiles."  Similar kinds of arguments arise in Iraq involving American/insurgent actions.

People are afraid to confront the true evil of the actions we and our allies take.  They are afraid of being accused of "siding with the enemy" or a fluffy charge of "moral equivalence."  Those arguments are abstract distractions, attempting to protect the discourse and assumptions they've constructed to rationalize evil, or to be more precise, to construct evil acts as morally legitimate and necessary.  The same goes for Islamic moderates accused of betraying their faith or people if they appease or collaborate with the Americans or Israelis.

And, of course, the result is the violence feeds more violence, and each side feels justified to expand the war and the deadliness of their tactics, each convinced they are on the side of good. 

Yet there are consequences.  First, there is no peace for either side.  Israel has succeeded in generating perhaps the highest level of anger and hatred towards the Jewish state in the Arab world for a long time, assuring support for Hezbollah and support for extremists.  These acts increase rather than decrease the danger to the state of Israel.  Hezbollah as well assures more violence against their people, and an international effort to stymie their ability to achieve a kind of legitimate role.  Hezbollah will ultimately need to achieve that kind of role before dialogue is possible, and the solution to these issues is not military (that's been absolutely proven) but political.  Second, a lot of innocent people die, lives are shattered, and pain is real and intense, both emotional and physical.  Children are severely affected, having an impact on the policies and thinking of the next generation.  These consequences are brushed aside by abstract rationalizers of evil who scoff at such 'sentimentality.'

But evil is still evil, and we are seeing acts of evil from Israel, Hezbollah, the United States and Iraqi insurgents.  One can choose to simply rationalize the evil their own side does (that does avoid having to deal with tough moral issues and questions about ones' own country and its policies) and condemn the other side, or one can face the reality that all these actions are, at base, indefensible.

August 6, 2006 - Pushing absurdity to an extreme

I've noted many times how the neo-conservatives and war hawks (especially the so-called chicken hawks, a term coined by military people to describe people who are extremely eager to use the military for political reasons, applied to people like Dick Cheney and Madeline Albright) are trying the best they can to ignore reality and rescue their theory of how they thought the world works.  That avoidance of dissonance is common, and I'm convinced it's a major cause for what Barbara Tuchman called "the March of Folly."  People with strong beliefs, especially when they're emotionally committed to them (e.g., have been fighting political battles for them against opponents they've come to see almost as enemies), do whatever they can to interpret reality into their theory rather than question what they hold true.   They go to great lengths to protect their world view, even if the fit is so forced it becomes absurd on its face.  Given the complexity of the international system, it is an easy thing to do -- one can build magnificent arguments and rhetorical masterpieces supporting a variety of different interpretations of reality.   The latest is also one of the most blatantly absurd: comparisons of the current situation to that of the 1930s, with the Arab world cast as the equivalent of the rising Germans and Japanese, while the West is seen standing by and not being assertive enough.  Yes, a rather large number of commentators have been making that claim, even though its absurdity is transparent.

The most glaring problem that has is the claim of western passiveness.  Hello!  Anybody catch the 2003 attack of Iraq, the massive response of Israel to an incursion that killed eight and kidnapped two military people?  (Aside: another fallacious path the whawkos -- whacko + hawk -- make is to mock those calling for a proportionate reaction.  Proportionate means that the response will be defensive and its impact will not yield more injustice than the justice it creates; it is not a call for simply an 'equal' response.  Israel's response to that minor incursion was an attack on all of Lebanon, which was not proportionate.  Hezbollah then responded with an escalation of their own -- one arguably more proportionate than Israel's initial response, if still immoral).  The west has been on the move, aggressive, pressuring states like Syria and Iran with ultimatums, and refusing negotiations and in the case of the US, even official diplomatic contact.  That's hardly anything like the 1930's!

Beyond that, Japan and Germany were world industrial powers, they had massive military machines.  I'm sorry, but even if Iran could get nukes, they could never truly be the kind of world power Germany was (and Germany's bid to dominate Europe was doomed to fail anyway).  Moreover, the boogey man of the "Islamic world" is a place filled with internal rivalries and no clear leadership.  Hezbollah vs. Al Qaeda, Shi'ite vs. Sunni, Arab vs. Non-Arab, Radical vs. Moderate, Conservative vs. Extremist, etc., etc.  They have no capacity to militarily conquer the West or even be close to the kind of powers Germany and Japan were, claims that they do are pure horse manure. 

Ah, but what about terrorism!?  There are two equally dangerous errors people make when considering terrorism: under-estimating or over-estimating the extent of the threat.  The idea that somehow an army of terrorists will lay waste to the western world is the stuff of neo-con horror fantasies.   But even 9-11 was a minor attack in terms of real damage (we've destroyed much more civilian life and property in Afghanistan, not to mention Iraq).  Important is that even despite the fact they now "hate us now more than ever" in the Mideast, there still isn't a groundswell to join a jihad against America.  We can turn this around with policies that actually engage other states, create dialogue, avoid military aggression, and  recognize that the social turmoil of Islamic modernization isn't going to be made easier if the West launches a modernization crusade.  The danger is that this could become a self-fulfilling prophecy if our aggression continues.

Those in Iran and in the Arab world have a better argument comparing us to Germany and Japan.  We've been aggressors, we've been building our military, we do not want a dialogue, we want to put in place regimes that met our ideological standards.  We treat our warriors as heroes, while ignoring their civilian dead.  We're the outsiders wanting to spread our way of thinking and our culture, we're the ones who want to get our hands on their oil.  Yet the neo-cons, who tend to think that the West has stumbled onto the "right" and "natural" way of thinking (hubris -- another comparison to past empires), don't seem to recognize that the fact we can rationalize our aggression to ourselves really doesn't convince many who are the target of that aggression.  As noted yesterday, they use the theory they go to great links to avoid questioning to also rationalize the civilian death and destruction.

So, no, those who try to claim the Islamic world is a threat akin to the 1930s deserve a metaphorical spit in the face.  Their argument is on its face absurd, but they don't see it because they're stuck in their rhetorical effort to defend an indefensible foreign policy theory.  Yet they are dangerous because their policies are aggressive, kill people, and threaten to spark anger and counter-hostility.

That last point is important to me.  I have two young sons, and while I am doing everything I can to make sure they can claim conscientious objector status should a draft come back, their future depends on the wisdom of policies we have today.  Today at Swann Lake, swimming and hiking (Maine is a place where you can still raise kids the old fashioned way -- long jaunts in the woods, swimming at the lake, hours in nature) I reflected on how insane it is for America, a land of true prosperity and quite a bit of freedom (though increasingly less in the past decades), to risk it all with foreign policy adventurism.  Why?! It's not like anyone in the Mideast could pose a real military threat to us.  I'll write more about oil in the coming weeks, but clearly adding violence and animosity to that region isn't about to stabilize oil prices or oil access (especially as Iraqis become increasingly anti-American).   Why send people here to kill and die for pointless causes -- and excuse me, nobody in Iraq is defending my freedom, that isn't a defensive war!  Watching children play (the beach was full of families), seeing the beautify of a countryside which in many parts of the world would be marred with violence or famine, caused we to wonder if we weren't squandering all we have as a nation out of fear and hubris. 

If it were just me, I'd observe it as I do much of political life -- rather detached, more from the standpoint of watching it unfold, that's why I've never been much of an activist.  But with two young boys it's suddenly personal -- if the whawkos aren't stopped, who knows what kind of damage they could cause.   I'm heartened that many former Generals (including Brent Skowcroft) and foreign policy leaders have the same fears.  I just wish the folks caught up in their theories would have a "reality moment," where instead of seeking evidence to simply avoid having to admit error (all the turning points, claims the media wasn't telling the 'whole story' and alleged 'progress' from Iraq, etc., are tactics to avoid reality), take a good hard look at themselves and not fear the prospect that they were wrong.  Some have done that, but far too many seem to treat this as a political issue rather than one of life and death.

August 8, 2006 - Reflections (prelude to an argument)

I can remember the time I became what often gets referred to as a "neo-isolationist."  I was living in Italy, working on my MA at Johns Hopkins SAIS Bologna Center, and chatting with a number of students, both European and American.  I grew up with a very internationalist perspective; I would say I had a view of US policy (at that time Cold War policy) from a standpoint that pretty much reflected the bi-partisan consensus.  We were drinking wine at a nice Osteria, and debating flexible response doctrine (how it works, if it's valid, does like a escalation dominance doom it, etc.)  I had for awhile been thinking about WWII -- I visited Germany, saw numerous older Germans handicapped most likely by the war.  I talked with some elderly German women in a train, sharing a compartment.  They told me war stories, stories about their brothers who were in the Hitler youth, how people were thinking (and how certain they were that the war had been forced on them by those wanting to destroy Germany), and how they hid from Russian soldiers who were raping German women after the war.   All of that was in German, of course -- conversations like that really convinced me of the value of a foreign language!

I walked through the villages and cities, and imagined the destruction, the loss of life, and the reality of the war.  I had similar thoughts about Italy, though I let my mind wander even farther into the past, from the Roman Empire through the battles of the Renaissance and beyond.  I had been thinking about all that, and suddenly the debate about extended nuclear deterrence (this was during the missile modernization of the early eighties, making such debates common) seemed a bit surreal.  "This is all bullshit," I said.  I don't remember exactly what I said next, but it was something to the extent that it was all power games by political leaders who didn't care about the reality of what their actions mean beyond the chess board.  The USSR a threat to Europe?  Hell, they can't even take Afghanistan, I noted.   And Europe is capable of defending itself, it's rich and has the capacity.  I then said I thought NATO should be disbanded, the US should get out of its imperial games.   At that point, and really ever since that point, I've thought that while trade and cooperation are great, military interventions and attempts to project power world wide were unnecessary and immoral.  Moreover, while self-defense and other-defense are legitimate causes of military action, political power machinations create situations where it's hard to tell what self-defense is -- both Hezbollah and Israel are claiming it, both with similar arguments.

I didn't meet any Soviets while in Bologna, but talked to a lot of East Europeans and became convinced of two things: 1) the East was in far worse shape than anyone realized; and 2) communism would be destroyed by communism, and if anything the Cold War helped it hold on longer because they were motivated by an external enemy.   The risks and costs of the Cold War were mostly unnecessary, rooted the dynamic of power politics and other interests, such as global dominance and access to resources.

When I worked in Washington for a Republican Senator I recall the young Reaganites talking about winnable nuclear war and a nuclear strategy that seemed almost to yearn for it (these weren't military people, but the classic example of what the military called 'chickenhawks' -- again, people with no military background but who yet love to advocate for the use of the military to achieve political ends).    I also remember being amazed by the addictive aspect of power; you walk through the marble buildings (I would pass in front of the capitol and the supreme court every morning and evening as I headed to the Capitol South metro stop), here great debates on the floor of the Senate, get the inside gossip, brush against 'big names' at parties, and you felt like the center of the world.  I soured on that quickly, but for some it was like a drug, and I realized that a lot of politics was due not to analysts carefully considering and choosing the best option, but what Graham Allison would call "bureaucratic politics," where policy resulted from a political struggle, with the struggle itself shaping even the kind of information used.

Why all this reminiscing?   Well, at that time I wrote my equivalent of a Master's thesis on the Kennedy years.  I later changed the title, but my original title was "The Apex of Hubris," as I argued that the JFK team thought they could remake the world, and, unable to let go of that illusion, set up America's biggest foreign policy disasters.  The Bush administration is much like the Kennedy administration in that regard.   I left DC cynical about government, and more convinced than ever that we were running the modern Rome, setting up our own demise.  Once the Cold War ended and America was "unrestrained," things have devolved.

Now to fast forward to 2006 -- Floyd Landis is being interviewed, and showing a very common American trait.  When caught doing something wrong, deny and attack your accusers.  Clinton's "I did not have sex with that woman," Barry Bonds and steroids, Cheney refusing to recant his "last throes" statement, and in general the bravado whereby we don't want to show weakness reflects a dangerous aspect of American culture.

All of this is a prelude to an argument I'll make in coming days for a neo-isolationist foreign policy.  That doesn't mean anti-globalization or trade, nor does it mean stopping immigration.  Rather, I want to argue that we are standing in a very dangerous place culturally, politically and in foreign affairs whereby our hubris and ignorance of the complexity of world events creates a real threat.  The only solution is to redefine American foreign policy.  (BTW, this is really an argument I started to make on March 1st and 2nd, so if anyone is reading this and interested in these ideas, click here and read the entries from March 1 and 2).

August 9, 2006 - Hubris, America and Foreign Policy

Wikipedia defines hubris as such: “Hubris or hybris (Greek ‛′Υβρις), according to its modern usage, is exaggerated pride or self-confidence, often resulting in fatal retribution. In Ancient Greek, however, hubris referred to a reckless disregard for the rights of another person resulting in social degradation for the victim.”  It almost seems like modern American culture has managed to blend the two apparently different definitions.  

 I am convinced that hubris is not an attribute of the average American; indeed, it is in part because the average American doesn’t have this trait or exhibit its faults that many Americans don’t really comprehend what’s coming from Washington.  They assume policy makers are like themselves, making tough decisions but from a well-intentioned, honest and sincere perspective.  People are very forgiving of their government, especially if someone they voted for is in power.

Let’s start with sports, and the Floyd Landis example I gave yesterday.  He apparently cheated in order to win, with the hope he wouldn’t get caught.  That’s part one of the definition – exaggerated self confidence, and losing the Tour de France title and perhaps is career is the retribution.  But when challenged, rather than humbly admit error he lashed out in attack against the officials who did the testing and accused them of having an agenda.  To defend himself he doesn’t care about those he attacks, the second part of the definition.

You see it all the time in politics.   The right tears down the left, the left tears down the right, and for many it doesn’t matter if their attack is fair – what matters is if it works.  The goal is to destroy careers and defeat opponents by any means necessary.  This doesn’t include everyone in each party, and certainly not the average folk involved in local and state politics.  I am convinced it describes a elite core at the national level who see politics as the ultimate form of non-violent warfare, the fight for power.  This certainly fulfills the second part of the definition (the original ancient Greek one) as there is no regard for the opponent, and in fact joy at seeing a Tom Delay or Cynthia McKinney brought down.  And many who do get cut down – Clinton with Lewinsky and his attempt to cover that up, all those associated with Abramoff, etc. – do so because of reckless self-confidence and arrogance.  They are in power, surrounded by supporters and rich powerful figures ready to reward them and tell them how important they are.  The nature of Washington DC breeds hubris.

For me, of course, the foreign policy implications are important.  Our foreign policy reflects our political culture: politicians proclaiming common American values while playing power games and exhibiting hubris.  The public doesn’t recognize it because they believe the politicians to be more like them than they are – and the politicians spend a lot of time and effort to cultivate the ‘proper’ image.

Thus we have a foreign policy that is recklessly over confident and arrogant.  With Syria and Iran we (meaning the policy makers acting in our name as a country) make ultimatums but refuse negotiation – they have to do what we want.  With Iraq the politicians naively believed they could create a pro-western democracy that would recognize Israel.   They ignored alliances and international law in order to pursue what they arrogantly believed was a foreign policy to re-shape the world.

They also fulfill the second half of the definition.  When people questioned their claims about WMD or how intelligence was used, the administration went on attack – the Valerie Plame case the most obvious example.  The attacks and ridicule continued against anyone who would speak out – aided by bloggers who felt complete when they could write nasty things about Cindy Sheehan or John Kerry. 

And, to be sure, if I were writing this in the late nineties I’d point out similar kinds of arrogance from the Clinton Administration; this is a bi-partisan hubris, though one that has really come out in the open since 9-11.  It is self-defeating, the supreme confidence in American power is misplaced and in fact wrong.  The supreme arrogance in assuming our goals are by definition moral destroys the ability for critical reflection.  The claims we are defending the “West” leads to actions which  turn western values on their face.  It is hubris that underlies the core foreign policy values of the US, a belief that we are a nation on a mission, reflecting the universally true best standards of humanity, justified to use our power as we wish.  We exercise it, and then trash, ridicule and in some cases try to destroy regimes that don’t want to play by our rules   It is a hubris in both senses of the word, and one very dangerous to our country and its values.

The solution to this problem is to look at what’s best in American culture – away from the top athletes, policy makers, and “elite,” and to the core values of the “real” American ideal.   More on that to come…

August 10, 2006 - America's Youth:  Apathetic?

(I know there are breaking stories of thwarted terror plots, more violence in Iraq's civil war, and no end in sight for the Israeli-Lebanon war, but I want to continue my argument in favor of a kind of neo-isolationism, rooted not in ideology but pragmatic American values -- the pragmatic humanism I talked about last month.  Today: those values and the youth).

If I talk with some of my slightly older colleagues -- those who were in college in the late sixties -- I sense a kind of annoyance and even disgust with the alleged apathy of the students today.  Where are the protests?  Where is the anger?  Is it the lack of a draft?  The lack of American deaths (compared to Vietnam), or just a culture of selfishness and consumerism which simply leads people to gaze away from the war and focus on their own personal indulgences?

I think they've got it all wrong.  Today's students are more engaged than ever, and more progressive minded than at any time since I started teaching 17 years ago (which to me suggests a trend).  Back during the Vietnam era protesters were everywhere, there was violence, and even the senseless murder of students at Kent State.  Yet the public overwhelmingly backed the war, and Nixon was able to use animosity towards the protesters as a way to appeal to the "silent majority" as he called it.  The 1972 Democratic nominee, Senator George McGovern, a decorated war hero with liberal politics but relatively "conservative" values, became associated with the radicals and the protesters, and didn't stand a chance.

Now we see students and other activists working behind the scenes in campaigns, on the net, on particular environmental and human rights issues, putting their energy into constructive ventures rather than simply protesting and seeking a counter-culture.  The result is that 60% now oppose the war (far greater than the opposition to the Vietnam war), distrust for President Bush is high, and despite Karl Rove's efforts, Democratic opposition is not associated with "defeatism."  In fact, it is mainstream middle America now to distrust the President and think the war a mistake.   That's why a Democratic party skeptical of the war won't suffer the same fate as the McGovern Democrats.

Moreover, students are not just focusing on things like the so called "netroots" political effort that allegedly won the campaign for Ned Lamont in the Connecticut primary.   They are focusing on issues such as the clean clothes campaign against sweat shop products, global warming, and a host of local issues.  This is constructive and ultimately has a more real impact than protests while not alienating the 'silent majority.' 

I also think the students have it right.  I don't really like protests much.  I've photographed a massive protest in Germany at a G-7 summit, in Munich.  The protesters were circled in by police, not allowed to get water or anything else, then finally arrested.  I took photos of the police hauling some away, and it was funny how the police were annoyed by my photography, and the protesters put on a show (struggled more, donned pained expressions) for the camera.  Maybe they thought I was press.  Another time I was invited to a protest at a planned parenthood clinic to counter a protest by religious fundamentalists against abortion.  As the protest started the religious fundies were yelling "you are like Hitler, guilty of a holocaust" while a guy on the pro-choice side yelled back "you worship a guy who had 12 butt buddies f**king him in the desert, you ugly piece of s**t."  I decided I didn't want to be associated with either group, and left the protest to chat with people on the sidelines.  Turned out it was all a ruse anyway, the clinic didn't perform abortions on the days they claimed, doing it secretly at different times when no protesters were present.

But what did all that accomplish?  It seemed to give an emotional rush to the participants, maybe got on the news, but if anything hardened opinions on each side, increasing the levels of anger and animosity.  I'm not saying protests are invalid -- some are very effective.  Reading the names of the Iraqi and American war dead to honor them on Veterans Day and also show the cost of the violence, or standing in a peace vigil to build a sense of community and shared experience, are examples of very effective and useful protests (as well as vigils to support the soldiers, etc.)  And, of course, sometimes protests are historically powerful, like the march on Washington in 1963 when Martin Luther King Jr. gave his "I have a Dream" speech.  But the kind of mass protests across the country like the US experienced in 1968 probably did less to affect policy than the kind of efforts youth are engaged in today.  Moreover, while many hippies quickly slipped into yuppie mode and forgot their 'peace and love' protest values, the kind of activism students are engaged in today is likely to persist into adulthood and render more effective citizens.

And it's those kinds of values that can define a foreign policy based on pragmatic humanism.   More to come...

August 11, 2006 - The nature of this "war"

There is a lot of speculation of what the violence in Israel and Iraq mean.  To some, it's a clash of civilization, Islam vs. the West (which, by the way, is the exact subject of an honors course I'm teaching this fall: Clash of Civilizations?  Islam and the West).  To others, it's just another chapter in the Israeli-Arab dispute.   For some it's WWIII, for some it's a crisis of varying degrees.  So what is it?

First, what it is NOT.  It is not a war like any war we've had in the past.  Comparisons to the prelude of World Wars I or II are stretched if not totally out of place.  If we define it as World War III, a clash of civilizations, a war against Islamic extremism (or for those wanting to piggyback on the anti-Hitler rhetoric, Islamic fascism), and we treat it like past wars, looking for military confrontation and battle, we will lose.  No, our militaries won't be defeated, we won't be conquered and made to convert to Islam, that isn't even remotely possible.  Rather, we will unleash a series of events that will destroy our economy, shatter domestic freedom, subvert our values, and leave us weakened and internally divided.  Treating this as a military WWIII is a road to ruin.

It also is NOT just another crisis.  It is real, involves motivated enemies of the West who are now finding it possible to arm themselves with very effective weapons at a cheap price.  It includes states, non-state actors that, while not complete proxies for states, often act in that capacity.  Oil is a fundamental factor, as oil prices could rise to a level that would bring deep recession or depression if things go too far.  This isn't Kosovo or Saddam's Iraq, this is much, much more dangerous.  It is even more dangerous than Nazi Germany.  Nazi Germany was a state that overstretched its capacity by attacking the USSR, and soon found itself unable to hold on to the land it quickly conquered.  States can be defeated, and when they are defeated, it's usually over.  The Mideast battles between states ended in 1973; the fighting there is of the new sort.

Nazi Germany could be defeated militarily, but Islamic extremism and the terror organizations that grow cannot.  That makes it doubly dangerous.  Moreover, part of their strategy is to goad us into self-defeating actions (such as trying to defeat them militarily), recognizing that Westerners have not learned what the colonial era should have taught them: conquest does not mean cultural change, and cannot subdue motivated insurgencies.  That makes this triply dangerous -- not only can't we defeat them militarily, but it's very possible they'll succeed in making us think not only that we can, but that we must.  Yet we could occupy Tehran, Damascus, Baghdad and even Riyadh and Cairo and we'd simply find ourselves faced with large insurgencies and untrustworthy allies.  The public at home would revolt when it became clear that the war was not only unwinnable but had disastrous consequences.  The populist movements that could arise at home in the aftermath of such a conflict are likely to themselves be dangerous and contrary to our current value on individual liberty.

The enemy, however, is neither monolithic nor permanent.  The terrorist organizations themselves are small; Hezbollah and Hamas field relatively small militias, and in fact have built their reputation on social services and public trust.  Most Muslims in the Mideast are conservative, but not extremist.  They are not in agreement with the radical ideologies and theologies being espoused.  But, like Americans after 9-11, they are susceptible to supporting violence and revenge out of anger and grief.  This war is a fight for the hearts and minds of the average Arab and more broadly Muslim.  It is not us trying to win their hearts and minds, that is the job of moderate and modernizing Muslims.  If our goal is to westernize them and make them think like us, we'll fail.  They have to make their own path to modernity.

The worst thing we can do in aiding those Muslim modernizers is to create support for the extremists through anger at violence and killing.  That's why the extremists want to goad us into action.  Their real war is with the moderates and modernizers of their own culture; they'd rather see Riyadh fall than Washington.   But yet this isn't something from which we can simply disengage either; the extremists won't go away if we stop fighting them, which means we have to find a way to confront them.  Yet military confrontation is not the way; it aids more than hurts them. 

That's where pragmatic humanism comes in.  Pragmatic in that we need to recognize the danger with no illusions.  We can't just be nice and everyone will smile and make up.  On the other hand, the danger is that actions based on what we understand from past wars could lead us into a trip with devastating consequences.  The good news is that while the West has an engine of violence -- colonialism, sweat shops, exploitation, and holocausts -- has done great harm, as an engine of freedom -- democracy, markets, human rights, individual liberty -- it has done great good.  What we need to start doing is playing to our better traits, and watching out for the dangers of our base cultural traits.  The West goes in down a dangerous plot when we use reason to rationalize our fears and anger; we find solutions when we use reason to aspire to our true values.  

August 12, 2006 - The French to the rescue!

It appears that Israel and Palestine have accepted a UN Security Council compromise that actually has a real chance to succeed.  Israel will withdraw from Lebanon, 15,000 UN soldiers (most French) along with 15,000 Lebanese will take over control of the South, with Hezbollah pulling back.  I have to spend more time studying the details, but there is hope.  Israel has learned it cannot defeat Hezbollah militarily; the attempt to destroy its strongholds within 30 kilometers of the border would be exceedingly costly, and not guaranteed to succeed in truly weakening Hezbollah in the long term.  Hezbollah knows it can't defeat Israel, but wants a dominant role in Lebanese politics.  With the UN as a buffer it is possible that: a) Hezbollah's ability to hurt Israel will weakened enough so as to truly diminish the threat, and the UN will be active in gathering intelligence to avoid the kind of miscalculation that took place during the last month; b) Hezbollah will parlay its new found popularity into a political program that, following Michel's iron law of oligarchy, will slowly move it from radicalism towards reform; and c) the UN can now show Syria and Iran that it's not just Israel and a US weakened by Iraq that they have to deal with, but a united Security Council which wants stability in the region.  There's even talk that James Baker, the Bush family friend, is working with others to try to bring about a shift of policy on Iraq -- maybe a final crackdown in Baghad then "it's your problem now" -- declare victory and leave.  If true, that monkey will be off the back of American diplomacy and more cooperative efforts from a humbled Bush White House will be possible, suggesting chances for much more effective engagement with the Arab and Muslim worlds.

Do I expect all that to happen?  If I had to bet, I'd say no -- the deal will fall apart, Hezbollah will decide to attack despite the UN or even attack UN forces, or Iran and Syria could find ways to muck it up.  The neo-cons could be resurgent in the White House and push for conflict with Syria or Iran.  A lot can go wrong.   But damn it, this is the best I've felt about the situation over there since it began, the first time in a long time it hasn't looked like either a long bloody war without a conclusive end or the start of a spark to a regional war.

So on the very start of what promises to be yet another glorious, beautiful weekend, I'm going to let myself be a bit optimistic that maybe, just maybe, there is a chance that there is a way out of the violence of the last month.

August 14, 2006 - Winners and Losers

As Lebanon calms, there is a lot of talk about who won and who lost.   Most of that talk concerns Israel or Hezbollah, or perhaps Syria, Iran and the US.  That, of course, misses the real tragedy of the war, the real losers (and winners if peace does come), and most importantly, may render invisible the true path to peace.  But first, the "traditional" political arguments.

Who won?  A lot of people claim Hezbollah came out on top.  After all, Israel's military was shown vulnerable in a way it hadn't been for some time, Israel vastly underestimated Hezbollah capacity, and even in the final ferocious assault had trouble degrading Hezbollah, who shot 250 rockets, the most of the war, the final day.  Hezbollah claims a 'strategic and historic victory,' and there are reports that they already are ignoring the cease fire by quietly repositioning their forces south of the Litani river.  In short, Israel thought they could render a quick swift strike that would critically weaken Hezbollah and send a strong message deterring future attacks, and instead got a message that Hezbollah is a kind of enemy they haven't faced before -- truly determined, disciplined, and well armed.

Yet Israel gained something very important: knowledge of their enemy.  They know how strong Hezbollah is -- as well as its points of weakness -- and having that first hand intelligence from fighting a war is extremely valuable.  Israeli public opinion may be upset about the harm down to the IDF reputation, but the intelligence community is probably feeling much better prepared for the future after what they learned.  And American pundits who waxed poetic about the need to "confront Iran" can see in microcosm what such a war would be like.  Given the problems in Iraq, I doubt anyone in the military thinks war with Iran even feasible at this time.

But, of course, while the world's attention is drawn to the French and Lebanese UN forces, Israeli introspection after a very troubling conflict, Iranian regional power and Hezbollah propaganda, the ones who really matter -- the millions of people on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border displaced by the fighting, often having lost loved ones -- are treated almost like a prop.  A few interviews to show what it's like for the people streaming back, a mass of refugees returning.  A side story -- one admittedly reported at times with much skill and compassion -- but it's the 'human interest' part of the story, not the nuts and bolts, not what matters in terms of creating peace and stability.  And that, I believe, is a mistake.  It really is the story, even if not recognized as such.

The only path to peace in the region is through the people.  The only way to undercut Hezbollah is to make their strong points amongst the civilian population -- education, social services and lack of corruption -- irrelevant.  Give an alternative to the Lebanese Shi'ites, that they don't need Hezbollah to help them eek out an existence.  Give the rest of Lebanon true hope, a strong international presence, and an emphasis on helping civilians rebuild their lives, and get hope for the future.  That isn't enough, of course.  We did really try that in Iraq and it was undercut by the sectarian rivalries and insurgent tactics.   But unlike Iraq, there is a true internationalization under UN control, with a kind of legitimacy the US occupation of Iraq never could have.  Also the Lebanese have a tradition of political tolerance in a multi-ethnic state of the sort the Iraqis do not.  Finally, Lebanon is smaller and lacks oil -- meaning that it is unlikely to be as much a corruption magnet as Iraq.  The losers were the civilians; they need to be the winners if there is any chance for true peace.

There will be a lot of speculation in coming weeks about just what the meaning of this war was (and I hope we keep it in the past tense!)  I see that Seymour Hersh, perhaps the most important journalist in America at this juncture, has a new piece out about Israeli-US communication about this war, and how many Americans saw it as a model of what could happen if the US fought Iran (I haven't read the piece yet -- I'm going to print it out and read it soon).  It should, however, be clear that military victory for either side, if possible, would be at an unthinkable cost.  Extremists only succeed because there are conditions -- anger at an opponent, lack of hope, emotional connection -- which allow them to win support.  The job now of the international community has to be to make sure that we do as much as possible to eliminate those conditions.  The winners should not be Hezbollah or "Israel" or even "Lebanon" as an abstraction.  The winners have to be the average folk on each side of the border who desire only normalcy, peace, and a right to make a living and raise children without war, violence and terror.    

August 15, 2006 - A question

A short entry today as this is a busy week.  To all those who claim we are "at war" with "Islamic fascism" or some such foe, please tell me just what the threat is that we face?  Terrorism is a threat, but the numbers even plots like that one discovered last week won't kill that many people (compared to the innocents our wars kill), nor does it mount a true threat to sovereignty of the United States by any means.  Moreover, that terrorism is a response to our interventionist policies.   Islamic groups are weak in terms of their ability to project power, can't really threaten the US, and in fact wouldn't even bother with us if we weren't trying to "reshape" the region.  So what's the threat?  What justifies starting wars, killing people, fracturing cultures, and spreading fear and paranoia?   It seems imperialism has become so "normal" to people that they don't even realize that we're creating our own vulnerabilities.   It's an abstract game to them.   You reap what you sow.

August 16, 2006 - When failure is imitated....

Again, a brief one as this is vacation week.  But I did read the Hersh article and I was shocked to see that Kosovo was cited as something Israel wanted to emulate.  While it's true that a mix of PR and post-conflict involvement has created a situation where one can say things are going better than they were in early 1999, the military campaign in that war was hardly a success.  The lesson one should have taken from that air war is how easily one can over-estimate the potential efficacy of an air campaign.  In Kosovo success was supposed to come quickly since the hard NATO bombardments would so devastate Serbia that they would within days agree to sign the Rambouillet accords to create a diplomatic solution.  Instead Serbia managed to hold out for over two months, and could have held out longer if they were truly devoted to holding on to Kosovo at all costs.  Kosovo was, as I noted last week, an example of the error of trying to win war on the cheap; not only did it last far longer than expected, but the bombing did nothing to help the Kosovar Albanians suffering at the hands of Serb militias.  The bombing of Serb infrastructure only pushed the country briefly towards greater support for Milosevic.

Studying the Kosovo war should have showed the Israelis that air power has limited value, and that against a Serbia not truly rallied around the cause of holding on to Kosovo.  The more motivated Islamic extremists of Hezbollah would be even harder to overcome with such tactics.  It's times like these I think that people in power really are caught up believing in the PR and wishful thinking, than truly appreciating reality.  Moreover, war is different now.  It's almost more a psychological and socio-cultural conflict, and raw power doesn't do the job.    Elites today are caught up in a way of thinking which doesn't really work in changing, globalizing world.

August 19, 2006  Armchair warriors

I live in paradise.  Two hours to the West and we're in the wondrous and beautiful White Mountains.  Two hours to the East and it's Acadia National Park, for my money one of the most beautiful places in America.  And closer are towns like Camden, Boothbay Harbor, Rangely, and other places to which tourists flock to get away from the stifling unnatural urban lifestyle which has overtaken so much of the country.  After a week of enjoying all of this, I scan the web and see the usual blather about "Islamic fascism" and a "threat to America," with some talk radio woman saying America is decaying from within, unable to meet an existential threat.  On blogs you see comparisons to the 1930s, as if we were facing major world military powers in some kind of true war.

I feel pity for these armchair warriors, so out of touch with reality that they find meaning and personal fulfillment in fantastic dramas of world confrontations in which they play a kind of heroic role, supposedly seeing and understanding the truth better than average folk deluded by the media and Democrats (who, if you believe Dick Cheney, get votes only from people who want to help al qaeda).   Some imagine a threat to the West, a West which they are defending against decadence and a strange danger (ironically, many Nazis believed that same rhetoric, with the Jews playing the rule Muslims play for our current paranoid fear mongers).   Never mind that these terrorist groups are small, poorly armed, with broker states which little real clout outside their region (and Syria isn't even a regional power).  Never mind that the US is the one acting more like Germany in the thirties -- a military power with an aggressive foreign policy.  They need the fear to give them a sense of purpose, they need to feel like they are somehow Winston Churchill types caught up in a world drama which they can feel a part of with blogs and an emotional connection to red meat rhetoric.  Poor fools.

They need to spend more time with their children or grandchildren, more time outdoors, more time getting some perspective, and more time appreciating that armchair warriors who get a sense of meaning out of fantasies about global conflict really are demonstrating a kind of inner emptiness.  When that inner emptiness becomes an epidemic, you get phenomena like Nazi Germany.   Hopefully, they will remain just a vocal and -- if you believe the polls -- increasingly marginalized minority here.    Otherwise, as I noted before, they could create a self-fulfilling prophecy.

August 20, 2006 - What we have -- and could lose

In the United States we have so much to be proud of: a constitution that posits a goal of equal justice and liberty for all -- a goal not yet completely achieved, but built into a system that has proven its ability to self-correct over 200 years.  At one point our democracy had slavery and minimal rights for women; over time we've built a more open, engaged and free society.  We have unprecedented prosperity in aggregate terms, and have a history of almost universal political legitimacy (almost everyone agrees the system is legitimate, even if they disagree with a particular government).  That has created a stability we take for granted; the idea of a coup or revolt in the US is laughable, we plan long range for our retirement and our children, with a sense that the steady progress towards a better tomorrow will continue.

Alas, all this can be lost.  It won't be lost because of some kind of attack by Islamic extremists -- they don't have the power to deny us these things.  They can provide a short term bite into our prosperity with higher oil prices, but the idea of terrorist groups like Hezbollah or al qaeda (an organization probably far weaker than many realize) can truly damage us is misguided.  The attacks on 9-11 were minor in real terms, even if the symbolic and psychological impact was great.   The destruction and death we've brought to innocents in Afghanistan and Iraq is far greater than the harm done on 9-11, and they can't afford to quickly rebuild like we do.

No, we can threaten our own prosperity and freedom by giving into the temptation of empire -- the belief that our principles are so true and just that we can try to force them on the world.  We can threaten our own future if we forget that our democracy as it is took centuries to build; just as we had major imperfections (slavery is pretty imperfect!) at the start, so will emerging democracies like Iran and Egypt.  Right now we see our political parties decay into propaganda machines.  No President had ever been as poll driven as Clinton, though Bush and the Rove machine eclipsed even Clinton's PR mania - and both parties now worry more about defining a clear message and sticking to it, than listening, debating and reflecting.   That's why no politician seems to want to admit a mistake -- it's not about finding truth anymore, it's about effective electoral politics.

We could quickly get sucked in to totally pointless and unwinnable conflicts like Iraq if we don't wise up.  Iraq was doomed to fail from the start, no matter what people now say about a "lack of planning" or "bad execution of the post-war period."  The political culture and the interests of different players, internal and external, assured that the US could not create a true western style democracy, and that the cost of creating a stable Iraq would have been higher than the US would have been willing to pay.  Not only in dollars, time and troops, but also in accepting a government that would almost certainly have had to have had a strong authoritarian streak.  Yet we're still in Iraq, and some people cling to the illusion things could still turn out right (though many would now call avoiding complete calamity a 'success'), or could have, if only a few mistakes hadn't been made.  What if we get sucked into something involving Iran, Syria or Pakistan?  What if that unleashes a wave in the region that ripples through Saudi Arabia, and suddenly we're saying "maybe it was a mistake, but we can't cut and run," and end up enmeshed in regional civil wars that can not have any clear victory for some time.  What will the cost be in our freedom, our prosperity, and our future?

Moreover, what will the Mideast lose in terms of having its high youth population driven to become anti-western due to the emotion of war, rather than allowing the modernist interpretations of Islam (probably more in line with true early Islam in many ways) to gain as young people recognize the value of freedom and markets?   Don't get me wrong.  As bad as it can possibly get, there is no true existential threat from Islamic terrorism.  Those groups are too weak and divided to ever conquer or even fundamentally damage the US directly.  But if our actions lead to militarism, spending of massive amounts to project military power, neglect the home front, and centralize power into an executive branch, the America of 2050 may look less like the "shining city on a hill" alluded to by many past Politicians, and more like a semi-democratic state in decline.

America's always had a dual personality.  We represent some of the greatest of enlightenment ideals of freedom, equality and liberty, while at the same time giving into the desire for wealth (vast class differences which are growing wider), empire (the low tech holocaust of native tribes to the current aggressive foreign policy), and control (policies towards Latin America in the early 20th century to the present).  We've always justified these negatives by an appeal to some higher good, but in retrospect that looks more like simple rationalizations.

The path of militarism, empire and war will lead to a weaker, more vulnerable and less free America.   The next two elections -- Congress in 2006 and the Presidency in 2008 -- are important.  For Congress, I think we need a check on Presidential power, and that can only happen if the Democrats gain control of at least one house.  The Presidency is less clear -- an honest reforming Republican who rejects the neo-conservative cause might be better than many more petty Democrats.  But unless we make choices which fundamentally move the US away from unilateralism and an imperial fear-driven mindset, we're playing with fire.  Our children will be the ones who get burned.

August 22, 2006  Meanwhile, the invisible wars continue...

 As the world focuses on the scuffle between Israel and Hezbollah, scant attention is paid to other wars, though the human cost is immense.  The UN has over 17,000 troops in Congo to try to keep the peace there.  Yet the battles continue as battles rage between forces loyal to President Kabila and those loyal to his rival, Jean-Pierre Bemba.  Congo's war had a brief moment in the spotlight early this summer when Time devoted a cover story to it,  pointing out that it has been the most deadly war on the planet since WWII.  The current fighting seems limited -- and world attention is focused less on its human cost or the situation for the Congolese than for the foreign diplomats trapped by the fighting -- but as Congo heads to an October runoff election between Kabila and Bemba things could get worse.  A number of rebel factions still exist, and forces remain loyal to their leaders rather than the idea of national unity.

If you look at the wars across sub-Saharan Africa as a set of connected wars driven by a desire for power along with ethnic rivalries, it is the most important "war" on the planet, and one that we should be talking about, sending assistance to the victims of, and taking very seriously.  To be sure, the UN does have peace keeping forces in place in Sudan, Burundi, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Congo, and the Western Sahara (formerly part of Morocco).   That means there are 60,000 UN troops active in these African hot spots, which isn't a small deal.  Yet this does very little to stop the rape, kidnapping, killing and poverty that defines these conflicts.  And, to be sure, a large portion of the troops there are other third world forces, the West and the wealthy states have little interest in the region.   Moreover, there are no peacekeepers in Angola, Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda, and Somalia -- or in countries like Chad and Rwanda where violence is all but on the surface.

I admit, I have fallen for the preoccupation with "America's war" and the Israeli-Lebanese conflict.  When you have people asserting WWIII is coming, and horrific scenes of civilian deaths (it's being called the children's war since more children died than combatants -- perhaps more children than adults) it's easy to follow the story the media is all over.  When the focus is on Iran (and really, Ayatollah Khameini is correct when he notes that President Bush is acting exceedingly arrogant -- the country with the most nukes, which has launched wars of aggression, and who is admittedly trying to reshape the Islamic world along western guidelines tries to tell Iran it can't do what we do) or Israel, it's easy to simply forget about the wars that are devastating diverse cultures already decimated by colonialism.

Next time President Bush -- or any American politician of either party -- waxes poetic on the horrid nature of Iranian theology (albeit, a democratic form of Islamic rule) and repression, remember that people in Iran live relatively good and actually relatively free lifestyles compared to the people suffering in numerous countries riveted by war in Africa.  It's all phony.  It's about power games and oil.  If people really cared about human rights and stopping repression, there would be a lot more being done in Africa.  After a couple months of virtually ignoring those wars and issues, I'm going to remind myself that one purpose of this blog is to talk about those things not being discussed in the media, and to do what I can to make those invisible wars more visible.

August 24, 2006 - Presidential candor

One of the frustrating things about how the White House has handled the Iraq fiasco is the fact they kept claiming progress was being made and tried to put a happy face on policy, despite obvious evidence to the contrary.  I listened to the President's press conference earlier this week, and was heartened that he's dropped a lot of the pretense, mentioned the possibility of civil war, and dropped the claims of progress.  Other reports indicate that there is gloom in the White House over the Mideast, and a growing realization that if the current effort to secure Baghdad fails, the US may have no choice but to declare victory and leave.

It seems surreal to me, how long its taken for the White House to see the obvious.  One explanation could be that they aren't so naive, but have been politically playing it until now, trying to spin things positively until something good would happen.  I suspect some of that took place, but listening to the President and reading various reports, I'm increasingly of the opinion that they are only beginning to recognize that they put the US in an untenable position.  The goals of the war were set at a level the US could not meet (establish democracy, reshape the Mideast), and failure is leading to a shift of power from the allies of the West to the extremists. 

The event which opened their eyes seems to have been Israel's failure to effectively handle Hezbollah.  That suggests their core mistake was that even until recently they did not truly comprehend that military power could not bring victory.  They believed that in Iraq they were fighting some dedicated hold outs whose defeat would allow the path to democracy to open wide.  When Israel's massive military machine could not significantly harm the 6000 strong Hezbollah guerrilla force in over a month of fighting (and the Lebanese people instead of directing anger at Hezbollah praised them as protecting Lebanon), and they confronted the options Iran would have in any show down over their nuclear program, they apparently started to appreciate how bad America's position in the Mideast has become.

To approach the Mideast effectively, a few basic facts have to be accepted: 1) Military power cannot reshape the Mideast to become democratic and friendly to the West, and in fact its use helps extremists who can point to an outside aggressor and show film of wounded and dead children to fire up the emotions of average folk; 2) Democracies grow slowly, and only in accord with a given culture -- the US slowly and gradually overcame slavery, the lack of rights for women, and other problems.  We did it without external cultures questioning our identity or trying to control our evolution; leading to 3) Globalization cannot succeed if the only choice given is (as per James Barber's book) McWorld or Jihad.  As Barber noted over a decade ago, globalization creates a threat to the identity and culture of the societies penetrated.  This creates a backlash, and people in the West, so convinced that our culture and politics reflect 'human nature' and the 'proper approach' to human rights, too often don't appreciate the power of that backlash.  We become so convinced that our system is the one to which others should aspire that we cannot comprehend it if they do not.  There has to be a possibility of cultures meshing practices and beliefs which may be wrong from a western perspective with further integration in the world economy.

After all, if the West truly does have the 'right way,' others will gradually work towards it as we did, if not pushed, shot at, or pressured.   They might, however, find different ways to exhibit modernization -- the idea that western values are universal may be just cultural arrogance.  The only way to deal with the region is to move away from being a threat -- from appearing like an imperial power trying to tell them "our way or you die" -- to becoming a potential partner.  The only way is to recognize that most Arabs and Muslims are not extremists, and that the best way to undercut Islamic extremism is to marginalize it.  The only way forward is to contain threats and engage the region in positive ways, eliminating any incentive for leaders in the region to put their systems at risk in a meaningless conflict.  After all, even big bad Iran has had a stable and patient foreign policy; the idea they'd risk all that in some foolish attack on the West is far fetched -- even more so if we stop trying to dominate the region and deliver ultimatums.

The President's moment of candor suggests perhaps a chance for rethinking our policy.   The President and his people may be too invested in the Iraq war to truly disengage, and may find it hard to actually accept the need to talk with Iran and Syria, but they could start moving policy towards a more realistic posture.  Then whoever wins in 2008, Democrat or Republican, will have the possibility to shift policy from one of military aggression to containment of threat alongside economic and political engagement.

The only argument given against that seems to be the old "they are crazy, they want to control the world, they are like Hitler..."  But that is utterly absurd.  The Islamic world is internally divided, has very limited military capacities, and relies on the West for their economic well being.  The idea we can't talk to them because they want to destroy us is perhaps the most dangerous kind of delusion out there, as it is the one belief which could prevent us from a policy that can work.

August 26, 2006 - The future of War

Globalization has changed war.  This has been obvious for some time, but up until recently the view in the Pentagon was that this change meant that the army had to become mobile, high-tech, and versatile.  Special operations would be more important, major battles by infantries less so. In fact, Donald Rumsfeld early in his tenure as Secretary of Defense seemed proud that, rather than fight the last war, his defense department was proactively reforming the military to meet the challenges of the 21st century.  No one could say the US military sat on its laurels after the Cold War, change was coming.

It is, however, becoming clear that globalization has completely altered the nature of war, and has done so in a way that we have yet to make sense of.  The failure in Iraq, while predictable, demonstrates that we require a new understanding of what war is.  New labels like asymmetrical warfare or low intensity conflict aren't enough.  Perhaps the most damaging thing to America's superpower status is not the policy errors we make or threats from particular groups but rather the altered nature of global politics and international security.

To think about what war is in the early 21st century, the "invisible wars" I mentioned on August 22nd offer a useful starting point.  Those have been long, drawn out conflicts in third world states with massive violations of human rights and the laws of war.  Children are consistently kidnapped or recruited as soldiers, often given drugs like cocaine to make them fearless fighters.  Large numbers of young boys are essentially turned into killers addicted to drugs before they are twelve.  Violence becomes a way of life, and in that context morality and ethics are subverted.  Moreover, the various groups follow different leaders, often one ethnic group against another, but sometimes the split is based on religion, ideology or personality.  Once the war is underway, these leaders have no interest in ending the war. 

Many of these wars are funding with illicit money from drug sales, diamond sales, or other forms of corruption.  Others simply live off the land, plundering villages and stealing relief supplies.  The leaders and the warriors have little hope; leaders might make peace to get a 'piece of the action' of governmental corruption, but that simply assures new movements.  These wars are driven by despair, corruption, and a culture is being defined by violence.  If we keep ignoring them, they will persist until they emerge as real threats to our future -- see the June 16th blog about terrorism in 2050.

Another place to look is not just Iraq, but consider Vietnam in the 60's, Afghanistan in the 80's (and today), and the Balkan Wars of the 90's.  The Americans and the Soviets were each bit by the changing nature of warfare during the Cold War, but because these were still seen in a Cold War lens, the Soviets eventually crumbled, and in the US revisionists try to claim the US could have won 'if only...', the real lessons weren't drawn.  The Balkans were seen as an anomaly, and as I noted earlier this month, the failure over Kosovo was re-defined through PR as a success because the Serb government eventually gave in.  In fact, the only case of "old fashioned war" was the 1991 Gulf War, but that ended without occupying Iraq or removing Saddam.  The reason was that the first Bush Administration had a sense of what a "new kind of war" would bring, and didn't want to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

In each of these conflicts large battles really don't decide the outcome.  Airpower seems dominant, but somehow isn't enough to achieve the desired political result.  Technology amazes, but often gets circumvented by surprise and dedication.  We win every battle, but seem to lose the war.  Moreover we are constantly caught by surprise; we blame bad intelligence, but its more than that, it's not understanding what kind of game we're in. Those in denial of the fundamental change which has taken place start scapegoating -- the media is being manipulated by the terrorists, the public doesn't understand the problem, Bush has mismanaged the war, etc.   But the reality is that war in the era of globalization is multi-dimensional and lacks rules.  The Bush Administration and Neo-conservatives assumed that with a huge, high tech, powerful military we could easily win against weak states in the Mideast.  They didn't take into account the changing nature of modern war.

What does this mean for the US?  First, we're not as powerful as we think.  That lesson is being learned now, and the quicker we come to terms with it, the less dangerous for us.  Second, we need to adjust both military and diplomatic methods to fit this new reality.  And third, we need to come to grips with the economic crisis brewing in the near future.  I wrote extensively about that in my June 23 blog, and the recent data about the housing market weakness suggests that we may be entering what could be a protracted decline.  The danger we're facing is not some kind of Islamic extremist threat to the West; as noted many times, that threat is over-hyped and over-blown.  The real threat comes from the fact we're entering a world that runs by different rules, rules which cancel out a lot of our advantages of the past.   If we are not able to recognize that and adjust, we may be facing very difficult days ahead. 

August 27, 2006 - Ahmadinejad

Juan Cole in his blog (http://juancole.com) makes a good point: why doesn't the media report that Ahmadinejad publicly states that Iran is not a threat to Israel, they do not want to use violence against Israel, and prefer a peaceful solution.  You don't have to believe him, but at the very least it should be reported that he is not publicly threatening to 'wipe Israel off the map,' the claim made by those who say we need to go war.  That's all for today -- a short Sunday blog entry.

August 28, 2006 - No one gets out of here alive

This blog is designed to be about my views on and reaction to international events, albeit sometimes with speculation about quantum physics and spirituality thrown in for fun.  I rarely go beyond a short mention of my personal life, because while I think I may have something interesting to say about the issues of the day, I'm under no illusion that anything I say about myself could be interesting.

But as summer ends and I get ready for a trip to Philadelphia for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, I find myself thinking about mortality.  The reason was from yesterday's headlines: the crash of a commuter jet very similar to the one I'm taking to Philly next week.  In the past (say, up until April 2003) that wouldn't have phased me a bit.  I'd have been sad for the victims and their families, but I was pretty good at following the statistics in terms of how much I would worry.  The odds are still far greater that I'd get killed in a car accident en route to the airport than the flight, fearing a plane cash because of such a headline is a classic cognitive error, conflating possibility with probability. 

Yet now with two very young sons, I can't help but think of what it would mean if something were to happen.  Not only would I not be able to see how they would grow, but they would lack a father, and only know me through blog entries like these, or my personal journal, perhaps my lecture notes, correspondences, photos, videos, etc.  Ryan would remember perhaps a few incidents, story telling at night (I make up my own), but their lives would be hurt.  It would really impact Natasha too, because as a father I am as involved in the children as she is -- the idea of traditional mommy and daddy roles don't exist with us, we simply divide the time.  I tend to follow where Ryan's ideas take him where she structures his play time more, but that makes a good balance.   Beyond that I commute, and sometimes in winter the roads can be treacherous.  I'm an older father, and while I keep myself in good shape, some health problems can strike out of the blue.  Just as those 50 people on the flight today got up thinking their whole life was ahead and not imagining that it would suddenly end, that could happen to any of us at any time.

Ryan taught me to love, even before he could communicate.  Dana is a joy, his smile melts me, and somehow I feel a part of him when we're together, he is so special.  He is calm, happy, and seems to just enjoy every moment.  Ryan is more active (and this is true going back to when Ryan was a baby) assertive, and stubborn -- but also happy and loads of fun.   I have so much love for my kids, and when I get them from day care I can't wait to see Ryan running to me saying "daddy, daddy!" as he runs into my arms and I left him high, or Dana looking at me and smiling broadly, reaching out for me.  Rubbing Ryan's back and tummy as he falls asleep, telling him stories, often spending an hour with him at the end of the day is beyond what many parents could tolerate.  But every day, every bedtime story, even when we watch Thomas the Tank Engine, Caillou or Clifford the Big Red Dog together is something special.  Even if I live to a ripe old age these days are so magical -- Ryan's laugh, Dana's laugh when he is watching Ryan, the funny things Ryan says...nothing in life is as joyful or as important as all that.  That  provides perspective, and also helps me understand and mourn at the tragedy of warfare with children as victims on so many levels.  When I hear of the death of children on a plane, say, recently in Russia I stop and feel some inner pain, even some tears wanting to come to my eyes, as I think about what that means to their parents.   And that helps me really appreciate what I have.

The more I thought about this, the more I pondered various possibilities of how one could deal with the fact we are mortal, the more comfortable I became with the whole situation.  Life is wonderful.  We have it, and we don't know why or how it's possible.  We know that in the course of time our lives are only a tiny portion of reality, despite how important they seem to us.  Within a few generations, everything we think so important will be forgotten; we will have impacted the world through our acts, but our names will hardly be remembered.   So we have to live, to do the things we want, how we want -- cognizant of dangers, but recognizing that risk is a part of existence.  The next flight, car ride, or trip to the doctor's office may harken the end of this existence.  One can choose not take a flight somewhere, then die in a car accident instead.  One can be careful about every risk one undertakes, then succumb to cancer.  Fear of death leads nowhere.  As long as one is rational in the risks one undertakes, worrying about what "might" happen is pointless -- somehow the world goes on its own course.

Taking a flight to Philly certainly isn't an irrational risk, especially since I'd probably be driving on the dangerous American highways if I were to stay home.  Commuting isn't an irrational risk.  Life contains a myriad of dangers, but that is life -- and life must be lived.  And if my time, or Natasha's time, or (and I shudder to think of this) if either of my children's time comes before expected, that is simply the way this reality is unfolding, and we have to deal with it.  We are mortal, regardless of age, nationality, or status.  Yet somehow, I also believe without evidence or proof, that we are also immortal -- spirits part of a complex reality that we in this three dimensional brane can't truly comprehend.

Is such a belief mere wishful thinking, designed to protect me from contemplating a nothingness that my will become my existence if the world is simply a material shell devoid of spiritual essence?  Perhaps.  But perhaps not.  And in this case I'll go with what seems right inside -- we're spirits in a material world, learning lessons, having fun, taking things too seriously, but destined for experiences far beyond what seem important in the here and now.  

August 30, 2006 -  If the Shoe were on the other foot...(my attempt at fiction)

Imagine an alternate universe where history did not quite unfold the same way as it did.   In this alternate universe, the Abassid Caliphate continued, there was no Ottoman Empire and rule of military dictatorship, and Islam maintained its tolerant, open approach to people and knowledge, modernizing before Europe.  In time, internal conflict weakened it, and Persia (present day Iran) emerged as the major world power, with the former Abassid empire maintaining wealth, but recognizing it was no longer the top Islamic power.  Persian influence spread throughout Southeast Asia, and was the basis of numerous military alliances.  After a Cold War with China, Iran is considered the unipolar power, dominant, with a view of spreading Islamic peace and morality (defined now in a modern sense) to the world.

The Europeans remained divided, and after the Hapsburgs put down the protestant political revolt in 1650 the movement went underground, and became radicalized.  Over time Europe's internal splits left it vulnerable to Abassid influence, though the Church remained strong enough to prevent domination.  European politics, in response to the external threats, veered to military dictatorship, with Christianity used as the rationale for rule.  Over time, however, the United States emerged as a new power, meshing radical protestantism with modern technology, and promoting "western, Christian" values.  Persia watched the rise of this western power with unease, fearing it could become a threat to the Islamic world.

Angered at the hoarding of oil by the industrialized Islamic states, European and American activists accused them of trying to keep the West down.  Moderates hoped to mesh the values of western enlightenment with Christianity and create a peaceful form of modernization that would not be a threat to the Islamic world.  But as Islamic values came more deeply into the West, there was a backlash, and radical Christian groups arose, making demands for cheaper oil.  Complicating all this was a small Sufi colony in southern Greece.  Established by a Sufi mystical sect fleeing persecution a hundred years earlier, it developed into a true modern economy in an otherwise backwards Europe.  It received military help and cheap oil from the Abassid regime and Persia, but it also emerged as symbolic of the growing hatred of Europeans and Americans for the Islamic world.  Greece was, after all, the land of Plato, Aristotle and Socrates.

"Reclaim Greece," was the mantra, and soon radical Christian and western groups engaged in terrorist acts aimed at driving the Sufis out of Greek territory.  Persia responded that they had been there for a long time, and had a right to their own state.   Some in the Islamic world rejected the idea that Christianity was a religion of peace, saying that the fondness of radical groups for passages in the Old Testament which commanded the Israelites to kill women and children as they devastated a city -- verses used by radicals to argue for the violent and uncompromising expansion of Christianity -- made the pacifistic verses of the New Testament irrelevant.    The prophet had taught a cosmopolitan vision and toleration of other religions, they argued, meaning Jews and Christians in the Islamic world -- ones who had modernized -- were doing very well, while Christianity was intolerant of both other faiths.  Christianity was a religion of conquest, they argued, look at the history of Europe.

The problems reached a climax when a group called "Christian Democracy Now," headed by a radical named William Jefferson Bush, launched a major terror attack which took down sky scrapers in Tehran using commercial jets.  The Islamic world was shocked at the brutality, especially as they saw dancing in the street from members of the Christian minority population in Greece, who were kept on reservations.  They realized the rise of the West was a danger.  Then the Americans, while holding on to Christian values and ruled by a radical Protestant regime, started development of a nuclear weapon.  The American people were proud; Persia's nuclear dominance had made it invincible and able to get its way on everything.  Moreover, Persian leaders were saying the way to stop terrorism and maintain long term peace was to bring Islam to the West, or, at the very least, mesh Islamic governance with Christian values.  This was seen by Americans as raw imperialism and a threat to their identity.

As America got closer to having a bomb, and as radical groups operating from Macedonia and Albania (supported by the American government) threatened Sufi Greece, Persia had two choices; a) launch a pre-emptive strike against America and its nascent threat in order to reshape the western world to fit Islamic values, or b) accept that America would get nuclear weapons, and that the West had to chart its own course of development.

After much debate they realized that "a" would fail -- no military attack could force Christians to give up their faith, and western ideas and western culture would be embraced even more tightly by Americans and Europeans in response to raw Islamic aggression, further radicalizing the Christian terror groups, and bringing more danger to Sufi Greece.  So they chose "b," and instead decreased the level of threat, stopped talking about expanding Islamic values into the West, and worked to support American and European moderates who argued that in the philosophies of forgotten thinkers such as Montesquieu and Jefferson provided a blueprint for a modernization of Christianity that was neither radical nor violent.  They gave statehood to the Christian minority in Sufi Greece (including control of parts of historic Athens), leading to a period of real danger from extremists who wanted the Sufis out completely, but over time that danger diminished as relations improved.  America did get the bomb, but contrary to the worst Persian fears, did not try to attack Sufi strongholds in Greece, or threaten the Abassid lands or Persia.

Indeed, Persia had the capacity to annihilate America many times over with its vast arsenal, the idea that even Americans would commit suicide just to kill Muslims was far overblown.  The Persians realized that the fears of a "World War" or the "end of Islam" from this rising western threat were misplaced.  After a couple of tense decades, a modern America started to appear, and, recapturing lost traditions from the Christian and "enlightenment" past, soon a modern Western way of thinking emerged, something that many in the Islamic world had thought impossible. 

When America and Persia signed a treaty of friendship 25 years after America got the bomb, they noted how close they had gotten to a conflict which would have been disastrous for both worlds.   And, ultimately the Sufis and Christians in Greece developed good relations and close economic ties, something which at one point seemed impossible.  They realized that the Koran and Bible shared a basic wisdom that making war would lead to more war and anger -- and that by acting according to the best of their values, they could build a peaceful future.

August 31, 2006 - The Summer of '06

The mornings are chilly, day time temps rarely hit 80, and it's clear that summer is fading into fall.  Classes are about to begin, and frankly I'm excited about my "Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations?" course, as well as "Syriana."   Personally, this was a very good summer and I'm looking forward to the fall semester.  But in the realm of world politics, the "Summer of '06" may be remembered as a point where major choices became necessary -- though we have yet to make them.

First, a few things have been clarified in world politics.  Israel is not invulnerable.  While Hezbollah did not really win, it's ability to stymie Israel's military for so long is a stark reminder to both the Israelis and the world community that the Jewish state remains a small well armed entity in the middle of the Arab world.  Sooner or later, if some kind of accord cannot be reached, it's possible the Arabs will be united enough and strong enough to defeat Israel.  That realization may bring more support for Israel from the UN and the EU, who recognize Israel does have an existential threat, and ultimately must bring Israel to make real compromises on the Palestinian issue rather than impose a unilateral 'solution' based on Israeli interests and politics.  This issue will not go away.

Second, Iran is a regional power.  Whether or not it really is working for a nuclear weapon is, of course, speculation.  But it is a major regional power, and the reason is in part due to American policies: arming the Shah (which included the start of the nuclear project), then first weakening and finally destroying Iran's main enemy -- Saddam's Iraq -- and finally having American troops in Iraq in a chaotic situation where Iran could easily cause a large Shi'ite uprising against American troops.  Part of it is geography -- Iran is highly populated, has oil resources, is not a country that could easily be invaded or conquered, and it can hide many aspects of its nuclear program.   The bad news is the possibilities President Bush raises when he talks about how difficult the region will be with a nuclear Iran.  The good news is that powerful countries have interests and can be dealt with.  There is no evidence that Iran is like Nazi Germany, and certainly it isn't fascist despite radical rhetoric these days.  Also it must be noted that the US invasion of Iraq pushed the hardliners into political power; they had been losing to the moderates and Iran had been slowly reforming before then.  Policies we undertake might help them hold on to power, or give them a rationale to block elections.  We need to be more aware of the consequences of our actions.

Third, even the administration realizes Iraq is a failure.  Even if in a best case scenario we can leave with a relatively stable Iraqi government in place, the goals of the policy were not close to being met, which means that the mission has already failed.  Moreover, the US is no longer feared or respected, thanks to how easily a rather small insurgency both stymied the American military and broke the political will for war at home.  Americans aren't stupid, they aren't going to go along with a costly war with no real rationale (the rationale given was already proven false, the new rationales are being made up on the fly and are unconvincing).   The old days of making ultimatums and relying on fear of American power to shape behavior are over, and that forces the US to cooperate with international organizations, and is one major reason why the Bush administration has abandoned so called "cowboy diplomacy." 

Fourth, the Islamic world is in flux, with numerous internal rivalries, a battle between extremists (still a minority) and various modernizers, conservatives, and secular voices.  This creates danger, such as al qaeda and Hezbollah, but it also means that there is no monolithic Islamic "threat," and the internal divisions are such that even Iran is not truly a threat to the United States except (and this a big except) in terms of oil.  Here the US has to avoid the kind of anti-Islamic rhetoric or idiotic claims about 'fascism' and instead recognize that our long term interests are best served by working to benefit the moderates and undercut the radicals.  And we can best do that by not interfering too much in their politics, and certainly not killing Muslims in well televised wars.

Finally, the US economy is still clicking along, but may be on the edge of a big let down.  The recent stats from the housing market, the continuing current accounts deficit, and the fears of oil price increases should crisis come to the Mideast all point to vulnerabilities.  The economy, not the military, is the true strength of the US and the West, and if it falters, the price could be immense.

The good news, at least, is so far hurricanes haven't been too bad.  Ernesto appears to have weakened over Florida (and was only a tropical storm at landing anyway) and as people commemorate the anniversary of Katrina, we don't see the same activity as last year.  But, of course, there are still two months of hurricane season left, and it only takes one big one to make a, well, splash.

Goodbye, Summer of '06.   You've clarified the international situation in a way which certainly helps make the problems and challenges clear.  The solutions, however, are harder to reach.