Blog entries are in chronological order
June 6, 2005: Back from Italy, and it was a wonderful trip, with excellent students and good faculty collaboration. Unlike Maine, we also enjoyed sunny, warm temperatures. The food was fantastic, and I could eat it without guilt since we were walking 10-15 miles a day. And, with the inlaws in town, as soon as I returned we headed to the White Mountains for four days. I will write more about the trip, and get back into my series I started awhile back, but right now I am swamped with work to catch up and a really messy office to clean. So if anyone is reading this (and I suspect there is sparse reading of faculty blogs in summer), check back in a week or so. I'm writing all this more for myself anyway -- to 'document' my ideas and perspectives -- but if anyone else is reading, thanks! Now it's back to reality. One thing that did strike me about the trip is how the quality of life in Italy is in many ways better than that of the US.
I've written before about the 'cult of materialism' that afflicts far too many Americans. People get caught up in the idea of getting more 'stuff,' and looking at 'wealth' and material accumulation as a kind of reason to be. That causes people to value the transient and meaningless aspects of life, rather than to focus on relationships and interactions. In Italy the way the cities are alive at night, the idea that you 'work, but not too hard,' and enjoy life creates a sense of living that we in America could learn from. The coffee is also much better there. Here in the US I'll drink day old cold coffee as readily as fresh coffee, because most American coffee is bland. It is a vehicle for caffeine, rather than a drink to enjoy. In Italy the flavors are intense and powerful, and caffeine is only an added bonus, not the reason for the drink.
But rather than ramble on about all that today, I'll try to catch up all my little tasks, clean my office, and get back to blogging either later this week or sometime next week. Ciao!
June 10, 2005: I do plan to write more about Italy, and assess how things have further deteriorated in Iraq, but today I simply offering part five of my series on Power and Governance:
Human nature (continued):
If human nature is basically benevolent but corruptible, then the problem of governance is to determine what kind of system will not act as a corrupting influence on individuals. The problem is multi-faceted. Any person can theoretically be ‘corrupted’ – or led to act against their basic nature – by any kind of interaction with the world. That explains why there are so many negative beliefs about human kind, it is easy to find examples of people acting negatively (I’d argue unnaturally or corrupted), even in cases where it doesn’t appear there is much motivation to do so. The logical conclusion is that this is part of our nature, to be aggressive, greedy, or dishonest.
A negative experience with nature, or with other humans, can lead to fear or alienation, thereby leading people to try to compensate. Glibly this causes low self-esteem, and people try to remedy that by exercising power over others, or through self-punishment. Freud thought of this as an interplay between the wild forces of the Id, the stern morality of the super ego, and the self-interested ego, based in reality. But Freud’s notions ultimately are only a metaphoric starting point. A warning: I don’t have time to delve into all the issues of human nature and why we behave negatively. I want to focus on the major problems: dehumanization of the other, and hatred of the self.
Consider: we do have passions (anger, lust, etc.) that are rooted in the emotions, and which can lead to actions that are not rational, and seem to deny our benevolent human nature. When such things happen, we can act negatively, but out of an emotional response to a stimulus, not because our nature is truly corrupted. The corruption comes afterwards when we rationally try to deal with the actions we’ve undertaken. To borrow Freud’s terminology, the ego tries to make sense of what the id lead the self to do, recognizing (via the superego) that it was not a moral or correct kind of behavior. To put it in my terminology, the conscious self tries to understand why emotion or passion led to actions that one recognizes upon reflection as contrary to ones’ true nature. I don’t see a superego there as some kind of stern authoritarian (if Freud saw that, it may be because the culture in Germany in that era led to particular personality traits), but rather there is a basic knowledge that humans have of what they believe is right behavior. Humans are capable of recognizing when they violate that behavior, and then they try to deal with it.
The problem comes when people are afraid to accept that they have acted negatively, or if they are consumed by guilt at their actions. In such cases, there is a temptation to either rationalize the behavior (often through dehumanization of the victim of ones’ act; leading to racism, sexism, or an ability to see the other as less than a true subject), or to hate the self for giving in to the passions that caused the behavior. In the case of the former, the self creates abstract realities in which negative action is defined as acceptable, even though at some level the self knows it is not; this sets up a life time of contradictions that can lead to personality problems and difficulty with social interactions (sociopaths have this in the extreme). In the case of the latter the result is an inability to master the self (self-control or self-reliance) because the self is not trusted, and guilt creates a desire to punish or deny the self.
A point here has to be made about chemistry, since so much of psychology now focuses on chemical imbalances. Obviously, there are cases where there is real abnormal behavior, people’s ability to live in conjunction with “human nature” is thwarted by physical/chemical problems with the body. However, in non-extreme cases, there is probably a feed back mechanism in place; the inability to deal with the consequences of negative acts might cause mild chemical imbalances, creating a chicken/egg problem. I suspect that chemical treatment is only needed in extreme cases; most of the time self-mastery or self-control can be learned with work and therapy.
To wrap up today’s entry: events in the world can cause people to respond with emotion or passion in a way that denies the basic ethics humans in their nature know to be true. After doing this (or experiencing this from others), humans have a challenge to understand their behavior, accept their imperfection, try to develop ways to prevent such loses of control in the future (just like an infant learns to control temper tantrums after a certain age), and with honesty and realism reflect on and try to improve their behavior.
Most of what is needed to do this comes from family and community. Alienation is a disconnect from family and community (community defined as a close net group which shares experiences and most values), and thus the people most successful at dealing with their own imperfections have solid relationships. Much of this is outside politics. Yet since our definition of community has been overtaken by notions of polity and the state, the political system and how we experience it has an impact on our ability to live according to our nature, with the strength to not fall victim to the problems that occur as a result of negative actions out of passion or emotion. This gives a hint at another bias of mine: I’m being very reductionist in my search for a way to solve the problem of power and governance, I’m connecting the issues (at least in part) to individual psychology. This isn’t really popular these days, and may be misguided, but I’ll run with this approach for now.
June 13, 2005: Juan Cole (at www.juancole.com) has some interesting reflections on how Iraq has turned out so much worse than the Bush administration expected and promised. He's a must read anyway for anyone following events over there. I've been mulling over ways to extricate ourselves from the situation (I'll write an essay on that for the blog soon, I'm still thinking through this). The tough part is to take into account what is politically feasible given the US situation. In other words, I can come up with grand solutions if I could impose them by fiat. But to consider that something would have to be feasibly done by this administration in the country with its current political beliefs is the tough part. I fear this may end up being as much if not more of a pit than Vietnam, and the dangers to the country are immense. People are starting to see that -- over 60% want the US to pull out, most say it has not made us safer (quite the contrary!), most believe it hasn't been worth it. But how do we get "there from here"? More on that soon...today I'll add to the Power and Governance series:
Why all this on Human Nature?
One might wonder why speculate on human nature when thinking about governance? After all, human nature questions are notoriously contentious. One can’t prove a particular perspective correct, and evidence can be found to support a number of views on human nature. Even as psychologists probe the brain and the causes of behavior, the ‘big questions’ remain unanswerable in any definitive, scientific sense.
In political theory, however, the role of human nature is fundamental. The views of politics put forth by Hobbes, Locke, Marx, Rousseau and others can only make sense if their conceptions of human nature are accepted. Likewise, debates about war, international law, and human rights are all informed by various views about the nature of the human being. Change your view on human nature, you’ll change your political philosophy.
That puts us in a difficult situation. We all have biases that are inherent in any view on human nature one might have. Thus political philosophy is potentially simply the construction of systems of thought designed to formulate and explain what one subjectively believes true, but cannot prove. In that respect it has more in common with politics than with science! Consider political debates, especially between people who don’t really think through issues, but just emotionally connect with their biases. Often these get very nasty and emotional, with personal attacks replacing reasoned discourse. That is politics at its worst; people with biases and opinions waging war on those with different views, with the desire to win political power, or at the very least get some emotional satisfaction at cutting down “the other.” That’s why emotion-laden forums like talk radio do so much better than shows focused on fact and reason. Politics veers to the emotional, to the defense of opinions lacking reflection and self-criticism.
The goal of the political scientist and the political philosopher is to try to overcome this with (when possible) testable hypotheses and rigorous qualitative or quantitative research (sometimes simply to develop hypotheses and data in the absence of truly testable hypotheses). But for questions of human nature, a fundamental starting point for any political philosophy, we have to work with a framework that is usually unfalsifiable. Yet that does not mean we sink to levels of simply defending biases. It is necessary to:
a) be upfront about one’s perspective, and the fact it is a belief about human nature, not a ‘proven fact’;
b) work through the ramifications from that perspective (along with other core assumptions) on a theory of governance or politics;
c) compare this theory or perspective with those of other scholars, and with data from the real world.
At point “c” some theories will be less compelling than others. Different types of comparisons might yield different insights. But it is absolutely fundamental that anyone engaged in thinking about politics take very seriously the need for self-reflection, the ability to admit when one is wrong (that is a capacity that generally separates great thinkers from mundane ones), and an openness to different ideas. Note that while “b” can be done in relative isolation (looking at data, reflecting, writing), “c” needs communication and the sharing of ideas, especially with those who disagree with ones’ ideas.
One reason I publish this blog is that, even though no one may be reading it at this point, I am contributing to debate and discussion on this issue at some level, and that at least creates the possibility that this can make a difference, and expand or aid the development of political philosophy. That is not something just for professors or ‘movers and shakers.’ Every student, every factory worker, almost every person on the planet has the capacity to learn and think critically. In the age of the internet, everyone can at least put out a contribution. If it is read by only one person, it may make a difference (even if that person violently disagrees). Even if it is only read by my children decades from now, that can be very important. So onward!
June 20, 2005: Between Iraq and a Hard place: How to Get Out of Iraq
Right now the US is officially, undeniably, and tragically in a quagmire. A quagmire means there is no good way out. So now we have to shift from thinking about the blame game – who got us into this mess? – and move towards trying to figure out a solution. History will assign blame. How do we get out? I want to first go over some options, and then look back at Vietnam and figure out how we ultimately escaped from that quagmire.
What are the options?
Option 1: Leave. Just pick up and go. That appeals to a lot of us who knew ahead of time that this war would be a bad choice, and it also appeals to those of us who on moral and ethical terms think that we should stop killing people, especially if it’s not achieving any sort of positive outcome. From a policy stand point, however, this option is a non-starter.
First, it would be an absolute admission of defeat. There is nothing face saving about just leaving, we’d be saying, “gee, this wasn’t what we expected, goodbye.” It would be read throughout the world as trumpeting American weakness, render the Bush administration impotent, and leave Iraq to whatever powerful force might emerge. People would accuse the US of destroying Iraq and then leaving, not fulfilling the responsibility to undo the harm done. There is no way the Bush Administration could choose this.
Option 2: Enhance the troop levels, and seriously go for victory. This has some appeal to people on the left and right alike. If we could define victory clearly, than do whatever it takes to achieve it, we could end the war more quickly. There are some real problems here though. First, in fighting an insurgency more troops on the ground don’t necessarily translate into victory – indeed, insurgents are clever at hiding, blending in, and even becoming ‘normal citizens’ for awhile, recognizing that all they have to do is keep up some form of violence with time on their side. It isn’t like fighting another military force, there is no magic moment of victory. Perhaps at some point the insurgency will die out to a nuisance rather than a threat, but that would likely take years, perhaps decades. Add to that the impact this would have on Americans, already turning against the war in vast numbers (37% approval of Bush’s Iraqi policy, 60% wanting the US to pull out), and you see the problem. If there isn’t a quick solution, it would only push the country towards protest and dissent. A quick solution isn’t likely, and the ease of car bombing and the like suggests that things could be made to look worse by the insurgents in response to such an increase. Finally, even if the public could be brought on board, the military is over-stretched, the US has other concerns, and the budget is bursting already. Congressional approval for such an approach is not likely forthcoming, and attempting to push it could significantly hurt the GOP in 2006 and especially 2008.
Option 3: Stay the course. This has been the favorite lately, but the problems are clear. The troops aren’t able to keep peace. Most battles lately have been to stop foreign fighters from entering (taking place near the Syrian border), but foreign fighters haven’t been the problem. The stay the course option includes reintroduction of the terrorism rhetoric, with an attempt to bring back that 9-11 emotion. It won’t work; that emotion has given way to reasoned analysis, and it’s clear to everyone that Iraq isn’t about 9-11 or terrorism.
Recognizing that the news will not get better, the Administration wants to recast Iraq as a war on terrorism, and claim that "the terrorists" are making this a front in their war against America. Such a claim is utterly absurd. Most insurgents are Iraqi, and would not care about the US if we weren't there. Most are Sunni, simply wanting to prevent the Shi'ia from gaining power. In fact, any terrorist activity is of low cost to them, simply bleeding the US through a few acts, without a lot of risk. The more the US gets sucked into Iraq, the better it is for true terrorist organizations. Al qaeda and like organizations are gleeful about American policy. The option looks like it just maintains the same, continues the steady loss of popularity for the war, and has no sign of solution.
So what to do? In Vietnam Johnson couldn’t get out for many of the same reasons as listed above (albeit in a different form, given the different context). It took first a new President to leave. Does that mean we have to wait until 2008? Not necessarily. Let’s look at Nixon’s game plan: strike hard to knock the enemy off balance, engineer a peace treaty, then leave the situation in the hands of the Vietnamese people (the North would attack two years later and the war would be lost, but we were gone by then). In short: find a way to save face (Nixon’s term: peace with honor). Can this be done in Iraq?
Perhaps. Consider the fact that little is being done to try to stop the insurgency, most offensives aim at foreign fighters. This suggests preparation for a subtle shift in message. Rather making Iraq a stable democracy, we could say we are making it safe from outsiders, but will leave it to the Iraqis to build and establish a stable democracy (we can’t do everything for them afterall). So what does the US do in this scenario? A few more offensives near the Syrian border are accompanied by saber rattling against Syria. Syrian is drawn into a discussion, and undertakes some highly visible acts designed to assure that Syria will not be a base, perhaps including capturing and turning over high visibility targets.
The US may even sign a deal with Syria (in a best case scenario, this could connect to a Syrian-Israeli understanding). The US could engineer an improvement of relations with Iran (perhaps the tough talk on Iranian nuclear programs is part of this), where it appears Iran has softened due to US pressure. The US could then declare that the border regions are free of foreign fighters entering, and that Syria and Iran have been convinced that the US is serious in preventing them from helping foreign fighters invade. President Bush could announce that, given this state of affairs (perhaps a high profile capture or killing of Zarkawi could add to this all), Iraq was now safe from outside influence, and could build their own democracy. Bush could say that the Iraqis were trained enough to handle their own insurgents – all we can do is get rid of Saddam and train them, but we can’t fight all their battles for them. We could promise equipment and aid to help, but declare that since this is an internal Iraqi problem, it’s not our business, nor does it reflect a terrorist threat. Only the foreign fighters were terrorists, we’d claim. Then the pullout would start.
Practically, Iraq would likely fall into civil war, or have an authoritarian regime emerge, perhaps an Islamic regime similar in ways to Iran. Maybe once we’re gone, Syria and Iran would ignore their promises, recognizing that, like when Nixon left Vietnam, the US would be unlikely to want to re-enter the area. Or, perhaps, Iraqi forces with the US gone could create stability, as the unifying influence of opposition to foreign occupancy might defang the insurgency. Many things are possible. The US could declare peace with honor, claim that the terrorist aspect of the war (foreign fighters) was a success, and then wash its hands of future Iraqi directions.
This wouldn’t be victory, but it might be a way out of the quagmire. For the record, I prefer a quicker withdraw (closer to option 1), but realistically, I think the ‘peace with honor’ scenario is probably the best we can hope for.
June 21, 2005: The Christian Science Monitor always has good solid reporting. Here's a balanced piece analyzing the current strategy in Iraq: http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0621/p01s01-woiq.html.
The Washington Post has an interesting editorial on Cheney
and the White House before the war. I share the suspicion that the White
House truly believed that this would be easy, and the US would be welcomed as
liberators. Perhaps if they admit their mistakes and honestly talk to teh
American people, they could reclaim some credibility:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/20/AR2005062001177.html
I don't know if the White House has a plan to really extricate the US from Iraq, or if it still is convincing itself that victory is possible, and that the critics are just defeatists overlooking the progress. If it is the latter, I expect that within a year we'll start seeing more protests and public discontent, much like the mid-sixties saw increased dissatisfaction as it appeared the Johnson Administration was out of touch with reality, and couldn't accept the fact they had miscalculated. What makes it hard (as the CSM report shows) is that the US is winning 'tactical' victories, capturing insurgents, and having successful offensives. Yet that doesn't work. It doesn't weaken the insurgency or lessen the violence. Unlike wars of the past against great powers like Japan and Germany, the US isn't taking on a well defined foe with a specific military force. The insurgency is diffuse, violence against it can help expand its membership, and it is buying time and wanting a protracted conflict. Reality will have to be faced: the sooner the better. Now, an addition to the spirit and belief piece...
Why is the world here?
The most fundamental question is not just why are we here. One can imagine a universe like ours absent the planet earth. But why is there a world? Why is there existence? The question is, of course unanswerable. And it is with these unanswerables that we move from science to religion or, at least, spirituality.
Physicists tell us that reality is made up of primarily two particles: electrons and quarks (a mixture of up and down quarks make protons and neutrons). There are other particles. Light comes in photons, there are neutrinos, strange and charmed quarks, and other heavier generations of particles. There might be super particles (squarks, sleptons, etc.) reflecting super symmetry, and they are pretty sure there is something called the Higgs particle, reflecting a field that permeates all of space time (the Higgs field). That last particle has been called by one physicist the "God particle" because this field is everywhere, and gives mass to reality. There are also anti-particles (anti-electrons, anti-quarks, etc.) that have the opposite electrical charge as the 'normal' particles. Anti-up quarks are negative 2/3 charge, while up quarks are positive 2/3, for instance (down quarks are negative 1/3, anti-down quarks are positive 1/3). And, of course, string theory suggests that these particles are all strings, and exist in many dimensions beyond the three dimensions we can observe from our perspective (perhaps 10, perhaps 26, or some other number).
All of these particles came from the big bang, when energy levels were such that the forces of nature were unified, and reality burst into being. So far, so good. There is the odd question of why is there more matter than anti-matter, but there are feasible answers for that. BUT WHY ANYTHING? Ouch. That can make the brain sore. But while religious types might chuckle as they ask "what came before the big bang," scientists can respond, "why or how did a God come into being." Each side answers their respective question the same way: that's something we just have to accept.
A God hypothesis makes as much sense as any here, but let's not go with one of the human constructed God ideas inherent in individual world religions. Not Allah, not Jehovah, not the holy trinity. Let's just start with God as an hypothesis: God is the force that caused the creation of space-time, and granted it with the laws of physics which define our particular reality. Religious types can imagine God as a Will or a personality, scientists can consider it as simply a label for some kind of force or event not yet understood.
Do we need such an hypothesis? At one level, no. The world is, and we simply can accept it. But if we are going to try to deal with the question "why does anything exist" we do need some kind of 'god' hypothesis. (If the word 'god' has too much baggage for you, it can be replaced with 'nature' or 'force' or whatever you are more comfortable using). Something had to make a big bang possible; at the very least, there has to be circumstances where such an event had a probability.
Quantum mechanics might hint that this could be a random low probability of a universe that is something a kind of energy field. But that still makes one wonder about the field or other universe. A more religious person would argue that there was a purpose involved, a desire to create the world with certain attributes and laws. Which makes more sense?
Obviously, we can't do anything more than speculate. But we can reflect on why we don't know these answers. First, we don't know what came before space-time because, as members of space-time (limited to three dimensions in how we experience it), anything outside space-time is outside our frame of reference. Our speculations are bound by the kind of experience we have in this reality. As noted in the last entry, saying something is outside of space or time is non-sensical to us; we have no way of conceiving of such a state. Second, while we can gather evidence about the big bang (background microwave radiation, the inflation of the universe, etc.), it is utterly impossible to gather any evidence or data of what may have been the state of reality before the event. Third, we cannot fathom non-existence. We are incapable of conceiving of the possibility that there might have been no world. Try to envision utter non-existence. Vast space (no, space-time is an entity, even if empty), or solid nothingness (solidness is a perception of an attribute of an object)?
These are the starting points for speculation. Speculation will have to be playful, uncertain, and ultimately connect with experience in the world.
June 24, 2005: The propaganda has been heating up as violence escalates in Iraq. Cheney claimed (still believing his propaganda, perhaps) that the insurgency was in its 'last throes' (he defended that by talking about the dictionary meaning of 'throes') and -- most absurdly -- tried to compare this to the Battle of the Bulge and Okinawa. That is the point where the propaganda becomes so absurd that it really had morphed into comedy. This is not a battle against another military superpower where there can be a turning point or where they throw all they have at one battle hoping to turn things around. This is a battle against an insurgency that is building, and which can choose targets, play the time game, and score political victories despite successes in the American/Iraqi military offensives. If they are comparing this to Germany and Japan, they are grasping at whatever they can to try to convince themselves that things will get better. They are out of touch with reality.
Gen. Abizaid, however, is apparently having none of that,
contradicting the rosy statements from Washington:
http://csmonitor.com/2005/0624/dailyUpdate.html
Again, the Christian Science Monitor is a very reliable source, and when it labels the mixed messages 'startling,' and claims that the General is directly contradicting the White House, this shows that things are coming unhinged in the war room.
Perhaps they are upset by polls like this: http://www.rasmussenreports.com/2005/Provoking%20War.htm which show that more people blame Bush for the war in Iraq than blame Saddam. This is a level of public disapproval that was not reached during the Vietnam war. There the protests were louder and stronger, but the I don't believe there was ever a time when over 60% wanted the US out. And, reminiscent of Nixon's "I am not a crook" claim, Rumsfeld is saying that "this is not a quagmire:" http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=649225 It will be interesting -- if it wasn't for the fact that lives and the security of our nation was at stake, it would be amusing -- to see how these guys respond as reality closes in around them.
Meanwhile in Iran a major election is taking place. Yes, Iran is a democracy. There are limits based on the rule of the Guardian Council, but at age 25 it is a functioning system which has seen reformers make progress slowly. The US democracy at age 25 still had slavery and didn't allow women to vote! So the US condemns Iran and talks about spreading democracy, while photos of long lines at Iranian polls and analyses of what's at stake depending upon who wins full the airwaves. That must be embarrassing. Then, when the President tried to talk around this by saying the elections were meaningless in Iran, the result was an increase in support for the hardliner candidate, in order to react to the insult from the US. Ooops. Here's a link to an interesting prediction about the future of the US in Iraq: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ucrr/20050623/cm_ucrr/timetablesixmoreyearsiniraq/nc:742
The fact is that Iran is only in a state of building their kind of democracy. It will never look exactly like ours, and will have a strong Islamic foundation for a long time. But that's OK. They are making progress, and are more democratic than our allies in the region. Their nuclear program is a problem, but clearly the goal can't be to 'spread democracy' to Iran. They are developing democracy on their own -- slowly and imperfectly -- but "slow and imperfect" would be an optimistic assessment of Iraq's democratic development!
Such a mess! If you look at the debate over Bolton for the UN, Judges for the Supreme Court, change for Social Security...well, it becomes clear that the Iraq war may be making Bush a lame duck earlier in his second term than usual.
June 27, 2005: Last week Cheney said that the insurgency was in its 'last throes.' Now Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld claims that the insurgency could go on for years (perhaps over a decade), will NOT be defeated by the US, but instead be defeated by the Iraqis: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-US-Iraq.html?ex=1120449600&en=7ce7bd8128834d38&ei=5070&emc=eta1
Note that Rumsfeld admits that it will take a political process to end the insurgency, and that the US has been facilitating meetings between the Iraqi government and various insurgent leaders (though clearly the US is the dominant actor in this -- the US still exercises considerable influence over the Iraqi government). Clearly this contradicts the unrealistic claims made last week -- comparing the Iraqi insurgency to Okinawa? Talk about laughably ridiculous! It also shows that the Administration recognizes that it needs a way out. Yet the problem with quagmires is that there is no clear way out that is acceptable to the people in charge.
The Administration has two goals, it seems, and they are hard to pursue concurrently. First, they want to gain public support for Iraq, which led Cheney to essentially say "we're close to victory, don't give up now." Second, recognizing that they are not close to victory, they want to figure out a way to extricate the US from the conflict in a face saving manner (i.e., a situation where they can declare victory and leave). The disconnect between the two creates a real credibility gap. The best solution would be to tell the truth, but that would be very embarrassing to an Administration that has made its name for never backing down and never admitting a mistake. Still, Rumsfeld's openness about the strength of the insurgency and the fact it will not be defeated by the US is a good sign.
Of course, the insurgents can't "win" either -- the non-Kurdish Sunnis are too weak, and ultimately will have to adapt to changed realities. Until the US is out or on the way out, however, the emotion of fighting the outside enemy will garner them support at home and from the rest of the Sunni Arab world, and allow them to go on quite awhile. That's another reason that the US has to recognize reality: we cannot create a stable democracy in Iraq, and the attempt to do so only fuels the violence and strengthens the insurgency. Whatever happens in Iraq will depend on choices made by Iraqis. The longer we stay, the more likely it will be that Iraq will have a civil war before stabilizing.
Perhaps the most damaging result from the Iraq adventure is
the impact US interventionism has had on Iranian politics. In the election
held this weekend the hardliner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
won a landslide victory.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/26/AR2005062601029.html
That, combined with the 2004 Majles election that put hardliners in power means Iranian politics has shifted to the right, and is more nationalist and conservative in their approach. This hurts the reform movement, and makes it less likely that Iran will be convinced to scrap its nuclear program. Moreover, with US forces stretched thin in Iraq, the Iranians know that the US is in no position to make any kind of military threat (and Iran could use its assets in Iraq to hurt the US if we tried). The turning point in Iranian politics from slow moves towards liberalism to a resurgence of the popularity of hardliners came after the US declared Iran part of the axis of evil. It is caused in large part by growing anti-Americanism in response to bombastic anti-Iranian rhetoric from the White House, and, of course, the US presence in Iraq.
Still, Iran's conservative clerics have been politically deft, and they may use this position of strength to carve out compromises that help them achieve economic goals (such as WTO membership) and better relations with the West. Only Nixon could go to China, they say, perhaps it takes an Ahmadinejad to go to the "west." But while one can hope for such a change, right now it's clear that reform in Iran has gone backwards (not that it was moving forward all that fast) thanks in part to American policy. And, while even young people might be swayed by the emotion of anti-Americanism, most Iranians do want change, and don't share the strict conservative views of those now in power. The social forces still point to long term change, but the lesson is that there is nothing we can really do to hasten it. Attempting to interfere helps the hardliners by allowing them to point to the interventionist external enemy.
June 29, 2005: Iraq and Vietnam
The question of whether Iraq is like Vietnam has been asked quite often; I've used the famous Vietnam era word 'quagmire' to describe Iraq, and have made other comparisons. But how far can one take this comparison, is Iraq really another Vietnam?
To answer that, I think we have to start by thinking about two major differences and what they mean. The first difference is profound: in Vietnam the US was dealing with an insurgency that was destined to win, as it had the support of most of the people. In Iraq the US is dealing with an insurgency destined to lose since it represents Iraqi Sunnis, who are only about 20% of the population. The goal of Ho's forces in Vietnam was to unify the country under one, nationalist rule; the goal of the Sunni insurgents is to divide Sunni and Shi'ite and somehow re-establish Sunni dominance. That is the second major difference: Iraq has three distinct ethnic groups with a significant portion of the population: Sunni Arab, Sunni Kurd, and Shi'ite Arab.
Saying that the insurgency is destined to lose may sound like really good news to American policy makers. Alas, the insurgency also doesn't look like it will be at all easy to defeat. It certainly is not in its last throes (regardless of what the definition of the word 'is' is), and its goal is not all out victory, but rather to start a true civil war which could gain support from the Sunni world. At the very least, they want to re-create the chaos that allowed the Sunnis to be able to grab power in the first place.
Here the similarities with Vietnam need to be mentioned (most of these are similar to the Soviets in Afghanistan too):
1. In both wars a very confident administration believed that the application of military power could achieve a political result. In Vietnam it was to create a viable, independent South Vietnam (an artificial creation meant to last only two years originally), able to defend itself from communism. This would stop the communist 'dominos' from falling, and prove America would indeed do everything possible to expand and preserve "liberty" (in quotations since the South Vietnamese government did not provide liberty). In Iraq the goal was to turn Iraq to a stable, functioning multi-ethnic democracy in order to stop Islamic extremism and prove that America could support the expansion of democracy and liberty in the Islamic world.
2. In both wars the enemy turned out to be an insurgency that could avoid playing by the 'rules of the game,' and could hide, hit and run, and "win" just be surviving. In both wars military success in official offensives and battles meant nothing; towns taken would return to the enemy once the troops left, insurgents could shift locations and tolerate loses without a significant loss of efficacy. In both wars, the insurgents had time on their side.
3. In both wars the insurgents got outside support. North Vietnam supported the Viet Cong with aid from the Soviets and Chinese at various times; the insurgents in Iraq are getting support from others in the Islamic world, especially extremists or others who dislike America and see this as a cheap way to bleed America. In some ways this is more problematic in Iraq because, though the support is not from another super power, the US has little diplomatic sway to try to limit it, or even be sure who is supporting the insurgents, and how much support their getting.
4. In both wars, lies overtook truth in trying to keep a skeptical public on board. In Iraq, there is an attempt to make it appear this is part of the 'war on terror,' and fighting them there means we won't fight them here. That is patently absurd, even to the point of ridiculousness. The emotion of having a foreign power in Iraq aids the insurgents in recruitment, something even the CIA acknowledges. The cost of sending a few foreign fighters to Iraq is negligible to the overall capacity of terrorist organizations outside Iraq to recruit and train -- and those who do go to Iraq and come back will have valuable skills. Most insurgents, even those doing terrorist acts in Iraq, are Iraqis who otherwise would not want to threaten or harm the US, let along travel to the US to fight.
The lie is in the popular rhetoric, but in many statements the true reason for the war is clear: there is a belief that if Iraq could become democratic, it would also be a very reliable oil supplier (meaning that if Saudi Arabia drifts into violence, there is another state that could turn on the flow), and pressure other states to embrace free markets and democracy. This would modernize the Mideast, help solve the Israeli-Palestinian issue, promote economic growth, keep oil flowing, and end the power of the terrorists. That is the connection to terrorism, ending terrorism is one of the many side effects of the grandiose plan. The reason this isn't explained directly is that it clearly is failing. Instead, just as in Vietnam fear of Communism was invoked as the reason to keep fighting, here it is fear of terrorism.
5. In both wars, you see that a democracy will not tolerate a poorly explained war, with shifting rationales, a credibility gap for the government, and increased costs with new clear end in sight. Support will erode, political pressure will build, and the result will be a need to find a face saving way out: "peace with honor."
6. In both wars massive suffering on the other side is mostly ignored, as rationale for the war becomes abstract, and costs focused solely on America's "sacrifice" for the sake of another people.
The bottom line is that similarities with Vietnam far outweigh the differences, and even the fact that the Iraqi insurgency can't win doesn't mean America can -- or that it's in our interest to spend (and die and kill) enough to defeat them. This only enhances the Jihadist desire for a cultural war, and shows America's weakness -- how can we remake a region if we can't even control a small state? Rather than killing them there before they get here, we are making more of them, with more desire to get here. We are neglecting that "terrorists" are not a state or an ethnic group that can be defeated, but a strategy that is chosen by people who believe they are fighting a just war against a stronger foe. To the extent we make ourselves seem like a foreign invader wanting oil, disrespecting the Koran (even if it's only minor violations, the damage is real), mistreating prisoners (again, even if there are few and far between minor violations, the impact is powerful), we feed the flames of anger, and embolden and empower terrorist leaders.
Like with Vietnam, we have to get out. It is the duty of Americans to hold the government accountable, pressure leaders, and try to force a change of policy. In so doing, we have to avoid repeating what happened in Vietnam concerning military personnel. They are serving the country bravely and in good faith. They are to be not only respected, but given aid (e.g., entrepreneurs forced to Iraq because they are reservists, etc.) and every assistance once out of the military. They are to be well equipped, and not overburdened. The people we need to focus upon are the politicians.
Like with Vietnam, the hawks will blame the media ('they're not reporting the good news'), blame those opposed to the war ('they are sending the wrong message to the enemy), and try to argue that we can't leave because it would harm prestige. But saving face and prestige is not worth dying and killing. In this case leaving would also make it easier for us to help Afghanistan (which is falling into more violence and chaos due to neglect -- it is becoming a true terrorist haven again), and really work against terrorism. Not only will it lose its big propaganda recruitment tool, but the US could use its resources to truly counter terrorism, and build the necessary international cooperation.
Like Vietnam, our leaders were led by hubris concerning our military and economic power to over estimate what that power could achieve. If we are not able to extricate ourselves soon, however, the cost might be far greater than it was in Vietnam. By the seventies the Soviets were already in economic decline, their system was already starting its collapse. Here the dangers of being sucked deeper into a quagmire are greater, because we are dealing with a danger we've yet to fully understand, and which does not seem to be on the verge of collapse.
June 30, 2005:
Today I'll take a break from the political analyses and add a section to my spirit and belief series.
Faith and Uncertainty
One might think that defining a "god hypothesis" in this way, so closely connected to scientific reasoning, means that traditional notions of faith, and perhaps faith itself, are obsolete. Yet if we are to hold any beliefs about things which are not testable, and which go into the realm of moral and ethical judgments outside of science, some kind of faith is required. Today I argue that reasonable faith is really not that much different than traditional notions of faith, correctly understood.
Back in College I had a Professor named Orvis Hanson who taught World Religions, An ordained Lutheran Minister, he had quit being a missionary in China because he realized the Chinese had their own faith, and it was wrong for him to try to replace one that works with an outside notion. The class had a mixed reaction. Some said that he should have stayed, since clearly the Chinese faith was wrong (this class was at Augustana College in Sioux Falls, and he had been a missionary in pre-Communist China). "How do I know their faith was wrong?" He asked. The students asserted that the Christian faith declares their faith to be wrong, and if he has faith in his religion, he has to believe their faith wrong. He pointed out that in such cases, anyone with any faith is required to never question their faith. One student said people shouldn't question faith, it would be like taking a match in a barn filled with hay. I remember sitting there, at that time a believing Lutheran, going through the logic in my mind and thinking to myself, "an unquestioned faith is meaningless, it's untested adherence to a belief with no foundation except that one decided to believe it."
I recall that conversation because I do not think the idea of uncertainty and faith are at all contradictory. Professor (and Reverend) Hanson was a devoted member of the Church and clergy, and recognized that faith by its nature was uncertainty -- how could you have faith in anything if it were possible to be certain? Certainty requires evidence and testing, faith is a belief despite uncertainty. And if one is uncertain, then one has to keep open the possibility another person's faith might be correct. In short, the nature of faith requires tolerance; if it is intolerant, it isn't faith, it is something profane, just an adherence to ones' beliefs with no effort to question, assess, or examine. Unfortunately, the nature of organized religions is such that often that boundary gets blurred. The faithful are told not to question, or that if they do, there are answers. Deep introspection is considered a 'crisis of faith' if one seriously doubts their beliefs. That is the kind of religion that turns destructive, that is a core reason why religions based on teachings of love, caring and empathy can turn into rationales for war, suicide bombings, and exclusion. That's why someone can claim that it is Christian to say 'kill a faggot for Christ,' even though there is no support for that kind of homophobia in the Bible. Unquestioned and unexamined faith by its nature does not work to make sure it is coherence with even the holy books it claims; it simply is a belief that is clung to.
The nature of faith and uncertainty is, therefore, set even without regard to the uncertainty inherent in the "god" hypothesis presented earlier. In talking about reasonable faith, I'm not talking about a break with what faith has been in the past, faith in its proper form has always recognized uncertainty and must therefore be defined by toleration of other faiths. Toleration of other beliefs does not mean acceptance or toleration of all other acts, it certainly does not require moral relativism, That is the fallacious argument given by dogmatists: if you want anyone to think they might be wrong and others might be right, you're a moral relativist! If you recognize human fallibility, you are a relativist! Relativism is a moral judgment that all faiths are of fundamentally equal value. Tolerance does not require that one believe in an inherent equality.
So reasonable faith is a faith that is open to new evidence and theories (like science), is tolerant and respectful of other faiths, realizing that faith is only necessary if there is uncertainty (like traditional religious faith, correctly understood), and allows one to make moral judgments and distinctions, based on beliefs about the world and human nature. In that sense, the God hypothesis reinforces the need to avoid a faith that fears to question itself (reminder -- this is the God hypothesis: God is the force that caused the creation of space-time, and granted it with the laws of physics which define our particular reality. Religious types can imagine God as a Will or a personality, scientists can consider it as simply a label for some kind of force or event not yet understood).
If the God hypothesis reinforces the need for a faith defined by uncertainty and tolerance of other faiths, it creates new questions in other areas: gathering evidence and making judgments. To deal with those questions we first have to back to the question of existence. One cannot possibly fathom or imagine non-existence of the world. But what is existence?