Note: entries are in chronological order
April 3: Dangerous Ideologies
Political ideologies can teach us a lot. Conservatism teaches the importance and power of tradition, and how a society rests on values and cultural norms that can't be shaped from above -- and are ditched only at a risk. Classical liberalism teaches about the power of markets and the importance of freedom. Socialism focuses on the dangers of exploitation and abuse of power, as well as the way social structures often defy the methodological individualism of classical liberalism. Fascism shows how publics can be easily led, and how emotion can trump reason, with people choosing to be part of a movement regardless of individual interests. So which ideology is right? That question is a dangerous one. It suggests the possibility of what I'd call totalizing ideologies.
I doubt very much that there is a right ideology. Moreover, those believing they have found the right, true, ideology are among the most dangerous people out there. They can easily believe themselves justified in imposing their ideals on others, believing often that this is not only for the good of society, but in order to have the true, right mode of social interaction. This can be religious -- such as Islamic extremism -- communist, and even capitalist libertarian. In each people think that either using reason or revealed truth they know how things should be, and are political active to try to make it that way.
It's obvious how this happens in Islamic extremism (and extremists of all religious persuasions) and in communism, but how could it be true about capitalist libertarianism? I've read material from some so-called libertarians who argue that democracy and elections should not take place because the people should not be allowed to change laws that do the only legitimate thing government should do: protect property rights and stop crime. Their argument is that reason has shown them that this is the limit of legitimate governmental activity, and any government that does more is actually stealing from citizens and engaged in immoral acts. Thus any political activity supporting taxation and re-distribution is seen by them as morally wrong, and many would justify doing away with elections and political competition in order to impose that kind of system.
Now, there's nothing wrong with believing that, or believing in a socialist or communist or even fascist ideology. The problem comes when one decides that they are so convinced by their ideology that they ignore the possibility they are wrong. If that's the case, the ideology becomes totalizing in that they want it to have total control over ideological space, and be the sole basis of political action. Quickly even the best intentioned ideology can become a rationale for control, domination and even atrocities. Not everyone falls into this trip, but many do.
But if someone is convinced they have the right answer, why should they not try to implement it? And if reason can't give us the right answer, how can we be justified in condemning torture, rape, and genocide? More on that tomorrow.
April 4: Yesterday I ended with the question of why reason can't give us the right political ideology or the "truth," and if not, how then can we condemn such things as genocide?
The limits of reason: Reason is useful as a pragmatic tool, but I'm convinced it is incapable of allowing us to uncover some kind of metaphysical truth. Philosophers have been trying for 2500 years or so and still can't agree. The reason is that reason essentially objectifies all of reality into discrete objects which are categorized, described and compared. How do you determine what object should get treated a particular way depends on your categorizations and definitions. Change the way things are categorized and defined, and reason will lead you to a different result. Reason cannot, however, give you the proper definitions and categorizations. That's all a definition game, with rationalizations for definitions which themselves rely on a definition game. There is no grounding, no fixed center.
Moreover, by positing things as objects it creates an object/subject split, whereby the self is limited to the individual who is thinking or perceiving, while all else is separate. This makes it easy to objectify others with reason, categorizing them in ways that rationalize everything from genocide to social welfare payments. We see this all the time, war, the acceptance of third world poverty, and discrimination all rest on a conception of others as being essentially an object. If the self is not poor, or gay, or in the third world, or the victim of a war, then those who are can be seen as objects in the discourse (even if one says, 'well, yes, of course they are human and have feelings.')
Nonetheless, I do not want this to sound anti-reason. Reason is a tool that can be used to assess situations and develop pragmatic approaches to problems, achieving goals, or understanding how social reality operates. Logic and reason are powerful tools which, used properly with respect to their limits, help us achieve great things. The main limit is that they don't give us the answer to what political system is best, what is the true nature of the world, and what behavior is ethical.
Ethics: So how do we get ethics, if not by reason? I would argue that once we let go of the need to have philosophical certainty before we declare something to be unethical, the question isn't so hard. First, I'd say that we need to expand our notion of "subjectivity" to be inclusive. The other is part of if not the self, at least a group with which one identifies. When I see an Iraqi family outside what used to be their home, I see a child that is essentially the same as my child. The father is the same as me. We are part of humanity. Important here is to break through the abstractions and objectifications and learn to truly see others as part of a kind of community. While one can't experience their actual living conditions, one can learn to see them as truly human and like oneself through films, novels, reading of personal accounts, travel, and other various ways to break through the disconnections our discourse makes so easy. I do this sort of thing in my courses with the purpose of supporting moral learning and breaking down the kinds of barriers people have towards developing an inclusive perspective.
Moreover, while this can lead us to hold such beliefs that genocide is wrong, murder is wrong, rape is wrong, we can also accept that it's just fine to hold these beliefs and develop community rules (either in a state or even internationally) that reflect these convictions, regardless of whether or not there is absolute proof its wrong. Can I prove genocide is wrong? No. But we -- through the UN -- can say, "as a species, we aren't going to commit genocide and will construct means to prevent it." But, one might protest, if it's not proven, then isn't this belief merely a contingent belief, one that might be overthrown someday?
Theoretically yes. That's the same in science too, even with well supported scientific theories such as how gravity operates or the nature of chemical reactions. Without absolute proof, you go with what works, you go with what you CHOOSE. Life is not about finding a rule book about what you are supposed to do and then doing it, it is about making choices from a myriad of possibilities, and artistically creating a life that is lived. Trying to follow rules won't lead to joy, it leads to anxiety. Creatively exploring the choices life provides creates joy. And as a society, I'm convinced that if we truly learn to avoid the objectification that makes it so easy to rationalize evil and develop a sense of common being with others, we will want to make choices that treat others with respect and dignity. After all, if we act ethically because a rule tells us to it's not as powerful as acting that way out of choice, and with joy.
April 6: The signs that reality is sinking in on Iraq are growing. Senator Kerry has finally called for an exit plan of removing troops by the end of the year (actually very similar to what I suggested a month or so ago -- do you suppose he reads my blog)? A number of Republicans in the House, recognizing the President's low approval ratings and the disconnect between the rhetoric and reality, are trying to initiate a critical debate on Iraq. Even the duo of Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Straw has not spurred the Iraqis to form a government, as political stalemate accompanies continuing violence and a low level, but real, civil war.
Iraq also looks less and less like part of the "war on terror" (though the metaphor of war against a strategy doesn't really make sense). Foreign fighters and al qaeda are not that prevalent in Iraq. Most insurgents are not anti-western Islamic fundamentalists, but ethnic Sunnis who fear Shi'ite domination enhanced by the ties between the Shi'ites and Iran. Beyond that you have Shi'ite militias becoming more active, and no rule of law or security. The al qaeda who do operate there aren't all that popular with the Iraqis, demonstrating that most Iraqi violence is not about terrorism -- we're not fighting them there so as not to fight them here -- but ethnic conflict in a broken state. All the fantasies of "turning points" or "things getting better," etc., are giving way to a stark understanding that this is something very complex and not something that the US can "win" militarily. But does the Administration have the capacity to admit a strategic error and change course?
There seems only one way to truly and boldly try to turn this around. Put aside fears that Iranian President Ahmadinejad is a Hitler, and open up a real diplomatic exchange. Same for Syria. Those two states have been branded by the US as targets for regime change, with the idea being that after Iraq the US would be in a position to exert intense pressure and military threats against these states. Clearly, that's not going to happen. So the reality is that we have "give diplomacy a chance," not because we necessarily trust the Syrians or Iranians, but our position is one where that's really our only option. Moreover, if the diplomatic track is truly tried and fails, it will be much easier for the US to rally international efforts to stabilize the region.
The US has experimented in the kind of "neo-conservative" (or hawkish liberal) policy of using our awesome power to try to boldly and decisively change Mideast politics. The idea was that we had a 'unipolar moment' as Charles Krauthammer called it, and were in a position to use our power to set the ground work for a peaceful and stable 21st century. Ah, the illusions of superpower! Not only does this mean the US was actively engaged in trying to alter the status quo to shape the system for its own interest (making it a revolutionary state in realist terms), but the administration vastly over-estimated the ease of the task. The neo-conservative experiment has failed. Just as Nixon broke completely with the Cold War conventional wisdom and opened up relations with China and the USSR, creating detente to help overcome the fiasco of Vietnam, we need a new foreign policy direction recognizing America's strategic situation.
Also, I think we need to get away from rhetoric of "them vs. us" and "terrorists lurking" and have a real appraisal of our security situation as we enter a very uncertain 21st century. Iraq has so dominated the news that people are forgetting the myriad of challenges facing us. More on that soon...
April 7: How many people are truly self-critical? I get amazed sometimes when I take the time (and rarely do I have it) to delve beyond the basic sources of information to read the myriad of op eds and other blogs out there. It seems that almost everybody simply tries to defend a position they have held, seeking evidence to support their view, rather than really stepping back and questioning whether or not they were in error. Humans are consistency seeking, dissonant information is routinely ignored, we know those things from psychology. But in the political discourse its almost a pathology.
Take the war in Iraq. (Please!) There are pundits who went from initial euphoria after Saddam fell, to assurances there was no real insurgency (with all the arguments about an insurgency is and how in Iraq it's just a few disgruntled Baathists), to claims that an election, then a constitution, then an election again, would mark the end. Every bit of good news -- a drop in insurgent activity, a call on Sunnis to participate, the capture of some former Saddam official -- was trumpted as proof that things were turning around, while the bad news was rationalized away.
The first sign that the lack of a self-critical perspective is becoming irrational is when the "blame the media" game starts. The claim there is that the media is "ignoring the good news" and "just reporting on bad things." Of course, when you dig and hear reports like the BBC talking to average Iraqis and information about what daily life is like in Iraq, it's hard to find much in the way of good news. When you look at the standard of living, oil production, and the economy, good news is hard to find. Lyndon Johnson blamed the media in Vietnam, labeling the New York Times the "Hanoi Times," similarly claiming they were obsessing on the bad. When the "blame the media" game starts, it's a sign things have gone very badly.
Some this relates to my discussion early this week on ideologies. As with ideologies, where some people simply choose one and interpret reality completely through their ideology, looking for ways to defend it against another "ism," people treat political issues with a similar kind of "faith." Even now as sectarian violence increases, they look for a way to rationalize holding on to a faith that this will, ultimately turn out well. A self-critical perspective seems to correspond to weakness.
That isn't true with everyone, of course. The brilliant conservative pundit William F. Buckley has declared the war a failure, recognizing reality. Neo-conservative Francis Fukayama has also admitted that things have not gone as expected; there are others. But there are also some who seem to think that the answer is to expand the war and bring Iran into the mix -- like a gambler who, realizing he's losing his shirt, decides that the answer is to up the ante. This includes people across the political spectrum too; I think a lot of Democrats have been uncritical about the efficacy of government programs and bureaucracy for a long time.
So is this just human nature, or our culture? Are we such consistency seeking creatures that most of us just don't choose to undertake the effort to honestly re-assess our perspectives? Or is it in part the way politics has become so partisan that people aren't focused so much on understanding reality, but rather on taking on the "other side?" This happened in the global warming debate too, scientific studies were dismissed, while people would grab at any claim by any scientist that perhaps it isn't a problem and parade that as proof. Self-critical means you look for evidence not just which supports ones' views, but also which challenges them. Self-critical requires one to take seriously those challenges, not as a threat but as an opportunity to improve ones' knowledge and understanding. Being self-critical brings rewards and makes it easier in life to learn and succeed because ultimately it yields a better understanding of reality. Alas, it seems missing these days in far too many places.
April 10: Like a Rock (Bob Seger) I ran (Flock of Seagulls).
So is Iran like Iraq? Will it be next? Seymour Hersh's article in The New Yorkers suggests that President Bush has determined that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable, and he can't leave the Iran problem to his successor. Moreover, many believe that success in stopping Iran's nuclear ambitions, and perhaps bringing regime change to Iran will save Bush's image, tarnished so severely by the fiasco in Iraq. The argument is that massive American bombing will embolden the moderates who dislike the current regime and they will rise up. Suddenly, by using massive force, America can right all that has gone wrong.
Of course, that's all absurd. The question for me is whether or not the policy makers at the top are so caught up in their illusions that they believe it. Another possibility could be that they want the Iranians to believe that they think they can pull this off. The US has few real strong policy options against Iran. The diplomatic track can't work unless the US moves from giving ultimatums to actually acknowledging Iran's legitimacy. The Bush Administration is loathe to do that. The military track is fraught with peril, as I've described in past blogs. Iran could create massive problems for the US in Iraq, could threaten the straights of Hormuz, and unleash a terror campaign. Or, also possible, the strikes could do minimal damage, Iran could play the victim and secretly continue their work, causing the West to wonder how much they really achieved. Meanwhile Islamic fundamentalists would use the attacks as further evidence of western imperialism and evil.
So perhaps the Bush Administration is playing a game of brinksmanship, matching the wild rhetoric that Ahmadinejad has used (which he may or may not believe -- after all, he isn't really the one with power to make determinations on Iranian foreign policy -- Khameini and the Guardian Council hold that power). The idea: if the Iranians think Bush is a wild Texas gambler, about to leave office, with nothing left to lose, he may be crazy enough to launch an attack, perhaps using bunker busting nuclear weapons, against Iran. In such a case, Iran may decide to blink after all, if only to wait out Bush. That wouldn't solve the problem, but could buy time.
The New York Times reports that it is more likely that the Bush administration would, in 2008, use conventional bombs that will be available and which will be able to reach 100 feet underground (Iranian bunkers are reported to be 75 feet down). Also, at this point we don't have the intelligence to really know what sites are essential to take out; by 2008, the argument goes, we very likely will have that information. Of course, all of this is public, so the Iranians know the debate too, and certainly are making their own calculations and preparations.
Hersh, who came to fame by finding out the true story of the Mai Lai massacre in Vietnam, and who has since developed close relationships with people high up in government and the military, reports that some Generals are ready to resign over the apparent desire for war by some in the Administration, and President Bush is described as having a messianic view of trying to expand democracy. Many believe Hersh gets his scoops because disgruntled careerists at the Pentagon and State Department trust him to keep mum on who they are, and see this as a way to use publicity to stop an Administration out of control. But it's also possible that he's being used to send disinformation to the Iranians. The Iranians publicly think so: they called his article 'psychological warfare.'
In any event, the fantasy that bombing will lead to an uprising against the hardliners (the same fantasy Bush's father had about Saddam in 1991, the same fantasy President Clinton had about Milosevic in 1999) defies common sense and history. In a bombing campaign people rally to support their country even if they dislike their government. The backlash in response to a US bombing campaign could be intense, immense, and could bring catastrophic results to America's position in the world and domestic stability. So stay tuned...
April 11: What a cliffhanger in Italy! First, though, a few additions to my thoughts yesterday. I heard an interview with Hersh where he claimed first that the planning for an attack on Iran, including nuclear weapons, was not contingency planning as the White House claims, but operational planning. Apparently the Joint Chiefs, believing that the nuclear option was "insane" tried to get that removed from operational planning, but the White House refused. Second, he did indeed consider the possibility that he was being used to scare Iran. He believes that's not the case because he initiated the conversations, he trusts these particular sources, and he's convinced that they are worried that the White House is out of touch with reality, and the potential cost of attacking Iran.
The cost, frankly, is the potential for an escalating war that could lead to economic collapse, and utter catastrophe for the United States. It would be like Pearl Harbor for Iran, a foreign power attacking them just to prevent them from being able to challenge their military. Political pressure has to be intense on the White House to make it virtually impossible to make that kind of choice. Leaks need to continue by those who seek to derail that possibility, reporters need to dig, and pressure need to continue. Luckily Republicans in Congress, recognizing that while the Bush Administration has only two more years, their struggle for power and policy continues beyond his term, are starting to critically assess the policy.
On to Italy! Wow, what an election! Silvio Berlusconi appeared beaten in the first exit polls, but as the votes were being counted initial projections put him in the lead -- the comeback kid! Now it appears that the center-left coalition of Romano Prodi will gain a slim majority in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, meaning Berlusconi will be out. There still is a chance the Senate will be in the camp of the center-right, creating something so unlikely I barely mention it in courses covering Italian politics: a split legislature. While we in the US are used to those kinds of 'checks and balances.' the system in Italy (voting for each at the same time, etc.) is set up to try to prevent that from occurring. And, so long as the election isn't too close, it doesn't. If it does, there may need to be new elections.
Moreover, the Center-Right coalition of Berlusconi is not done fighting. The margin of victory in the lower house was only 25,000, and they are demanding a recount. It's unlikely, but possible, that things could change. Also, they note that the small number of "Senators for life" create the margin of victory for the left in the Senate, and find it disturbing that these people, not the ones elected, will determine the majority. (These are people appointed for having done things of special merit, and includes former Presidents of the Republic). Even if Prodi holds on to the small majority, his coalition rests on a diverse set of parties ranging from centrist to far left, from those focused on economic issues to the Greens. Trying to govern will be tough; every party knows that it has the power to break the coalition if it leaves (the majority in the Chamber of Deputies will be statute be large enough, but the Senate will be a majority of one or two). Do not be surprised if there is another Italian election in not too long.
Berlusconi was behind in the polls and bounced back due to a heavy media campaign where he dominated the air waves, lambasting the opposition (some say slandering) in the kind of slash and burn mudslinging that has come to define electoral campaigns in these days where media blitz is far more effective than reasoned debate. Apparently, it worked. But it may not have been enough to keep Prodi from power. But can such a coalition govern? We'll see. First they have to sort out the election results, and yet more surprises may come.
April 12: A bit more on Iran -- they have started enriching uranium with a measly 180 centrifuges. There is no hurry to deal with Iran here, and no clear violation of the non-proliferation treaty. The war mongers are, apparently, addicted to the idea of using force and violence, and fantasizing about the "evil doers" they wish to take on. It would be comical if not for the fact the consequences of such action could be devastating.
Let's reflect on the last fifteen years, the time since the end of the Cold War. The US has been directly involved in wars in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. The US has demurred from involvement in places like Rwanda and Sudan, where genocide has occurred. In the Rwanda case 800,000 were killed as the Clinton administration dithered on whether it was genocide or just "acts of genocide," figuring that a word game was what mattered in determining policy.
Why is it that we are so willing to get involved in some wars, even to the point of being aggressors in Kosovo and Iraq, yet so unwilling to get involved when atrocities and even genocide occurs? The answer seems clear: war is not looked at in terms of its reality -- the brutal killing of other people, destruction of societies, and the breaking up of families. Rather, war is an abstract power game, whereby one thinks in categories of "good, evil, national interest, oil prices, ideology, and power." The subjects of war are states, political leaders, military capacities, and even natural resources like oil. Corporations and markets can also be subjects. The subjects matter. What happens to the subjects is the focus, the rationale, and the justification of war.
Those who lack power and aren't making political decisions are the objects of war. War happens to them. The politicians might mouth the words that it's tragic, war boosters will say, "well, people get killed in war, that's what war is all about." But in the calculation of whether or not war is necessary, they aren't taken into consideration. They don't matter; they are invisible. 2400 American soldiers die, and that matters, they are subjects in terms of our media and out public. But 40,000 Iraqis dying, their families being broken up, cities ungovernable...well, they're just objects, things to consider with pity, but not as real as our soldiers.
When the victims are objects, efforts aren't made to try to help them, their suffering is not considered important. When they are being butchered in Rwanda (and now Sudan) we can rationalize not getting involved. When they are being beaten, raped and forced form their homes in Kosovo we fly at 15,000 feet and higher, making us unable to help the victims (the objects) but protecting our pilots (the subjects). No Americans died in that war.
By considering victims as objects, war because easier to choose and justify. All you need is to play a rationalization game with the categories of power, ideology, national interest, or 'good and evil.' You posit consequences of non-action within those categories, rationalized through assumptions and claims that are likely trumped up, and pretty soon war can seem like a very good idea. Those arguing against it also play a rationalization game with those categories; if you talk about the victims you're dismissed as not truly understanding what's at stake -- you have to deal with the subjects, they matter, they count. Concern for the objects is dismissed as sentimentality. Emotion of nationalism and fear is embraced, emotion of concerned for fellow humans is scoffed at.
My next major research project is going to veer away from German foreign policy and explore this phenomenon. As we became an aggressor state, a revolutionary power trying to alter the status quo to fit our ideology and interests, we are drifting into dangerous territory. Yet most people don't recognize that it's happening and what it means, they are caught up in the language of power, and the rhetoric of fear.
April 13: I'm teaching two courses this fall which should be really interesting. One is "Clash of Civilizations? Islam and the West." We'll start with the classic by Samuel Huntington (originally in the early nineties) arguing that the end of the ideological conflicts of the 20th century will bring "civilizational" conflicts in the 21st. Globalization assures cultural interaction between civilizations (societies which share a general cultural world view and historical development, like the West) at a level greater than ever before. This could create a backlash, as many cultural world views are very different, and people could believe their identity or way of life under threat.
The way we're going to approach this course is to investigate the two civilizations in terms of their history and underlying values. This means spending a lot of time on both western and Islamic thought from the past, tracing their development to the present. We'll then connect this to current events, and assess Huntington's thesis and recommendations. I'm excited because I always learn a lot in honors courses as people come from different disciplines and provide insights that are not always typical in the field of political science. Moreover, in political science we tend to focus on issues of the day, when reality is driven by deep cultural values and traditions which shape how people think and understand their world.
In fact, the more I study politics the more convinced I am that the conservative critique of modernity has some value. Conservative thinkers (I mentioned Hayek and Burke last month) point out the importance of culture and tradition in giving societies and even individuals a sense of meaning and value. Conservatives thus emphasize religion, national traditions, and a continuation of the past. I disagree with that political program: modernism has become itself the dominant tradition of the West, and its core values of change, progress, and rationalism aren't going to go away. There has been a culture shift, and even most conservatives today don't want to go back to the kind of arguments classical conservatives made. Classical conservatives do, however, have a take on what makes societies run -- and on the limits of rationalism and reason to address questions of value and meaning. In an era of globalization we need to take those things seriously. Too many people seem to think that if only the dictators would go away, people would make the same kind of choices we do. That's not how the world works.
A similar course next semester will be a first year seminar Syriana which will use the recent film by that name as a take off point for understanding Mideast politics, the oil economy, and clandestine intelligence operations. This one is challenging; the idea is that students will watch the movie twice (and perhaps snippets during the semester) and write a reaction essay, comparing their understanding of the themes and issues of this controversial film at the start and the end of the course. This one will be a lot of work! But, of course, that's in the fall, and there are still a few weeks of this semester left.
And back to the issue of war: Chad is today experiencing a rebel attack on their capital. On April 29th the Global Night Commute will take place to give some visibility to the otherwise invisible suffering of children in Africa, often kidnapped and forced into becoming soldiers, sex slaves or both. The violence in Uganda isn't that much different (though on a smaller scale and without official government support) than what's happening in Sudan, but receives even less attention. The honors course (and two years ago first year seminar) on Children and War I'm co-teaching with Dr. Mellisa Clawson has really helped open my eyes to the reality of something that intellectually I knew about, but never really engaged.
April 14: The sudden rush of retired Generals and military officials to call for Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's resignation is interesting. Clearly, this is a coordinated effort by former military leaders, many of whom were brushed aside when they warned of potential dangers in Iraq and often sent to early retirement, to pressure the man they think is responsible for much of what has gone wrong in Iraq.
President Bush has resisted such calls, perhaps because he as much as Rumsfeld was convinced by the pre-war neo-conservative arguments (the same people are now arguing for a war on Iran, though I hope their failure in Iraq has made their points less convincing within the administration). Why would he fire someone for thinking the same way he did? However, if Bush is to salvage the last two years of his Presidency, he needs to make some major changes. Right now things look bleak. 2005 was the "year from hell" for the Bush White House, and they greeted the new year with a sense of optimism -- how could things get worse?
Alas, the continuing unraveling of Iraq, more scandals, massive budget deficits and a weird immigration 'confrontation' have kept pressure on the White House, and 2006 looks no better than 2005. The White House appears to be stuck in lame duck mode; the first two years of a second term is when a President is supposed to be bold, acting on the 'mandate' of re-election, with recognition that the last two years will be overshadowed by the upcoming election campaign. Instead these first two years were catastrophic, and the President risks being remembered more for ineptitude than the kind of bold leadership people attributed to him in 2001-02. If the Democrats take just one house of Congress in the fall, investigations may tear away at the Presidency even more.
So what should he do? Clearly the best course of action from my perspective would be to dramatically change course in foreign policy, especially Iraq. That's not going to happen. So given what he is willing to do, the President at the very least needs to present a more credible team on Iraq and foreign policy. In that light, it is absurd to keep Rumsfeld on as Defense Secretary. Rumsfeld symbolizes the bad planning and double talk that cause people to mistrust the administration on the Iraq war. He has given "good news" far too often, and far too optimistically. If the President means to garner any credibility, he has to try to build a bi-partisan foreign policy, clearly noting that mistakes were made in Iraq (thousands of tactical and strategic errors, to amend Rice's statement), and we as a nation need to figure out what to do to get the best possible outcome, given the realities on the ground.
The President doesn't need to put someone too critical of him as Secretary of Defense, but perhaps someone like a Lieberman or Hagel would be good: someone with credibility. Frankly, I'd say he should replace Cheney with Senator Olympia Snowe, but the fact Cheney was elected puts him in a different category than a cabinet secretary. The wider discussion of "what next" should involve even those who have been harshly critical, the President needs to somehow break the partisan line that divides the country. In other words, the Administration has to recognize that their tactics and style have become self-defeating, and as hard as it might be to admit errors and open up to new paths and suggestions, it's the only chance to salvage what's left of his term. Will that happen? Probably not. The insiders tend to be hardball politicians who would see such a thing as weakness and defeat. Perhaps like LBJ in Vietnam, there is a fear that admitting error will mean that people will blame the Administration for needless death and destruction. But right now we get rhetoric and limp appeals to emotion and nationalism. That's not going to work. If President Bush is to avoid being remembered as a failed President, he needs to make real changes in both substance and style, and do so soon.
April 18: Gridlock vs. Efficiency
In Comparative politics the first country we examine is Great Britain, whose Prime Minister enjoys almost total policy power. Parliamenty sovereignty means that there is no real separation of power; no court can overturn a parliamentary decision, no executive can veto it, no second house has to pass it (the House of Lords can delay, but not prevent passage). The Prime Minister, due to party loyalty, controls the agenda, determines which laws will be passed and in what manner, and acts, to compare it with the US system, as President, Senate Majority Leader, Speaker of the House, and the Supreme Court in one person. It works due to the power of tradition, and the fact that Prime Ministers need to behave in a particular manner to keep their party loyal.
This means government can act quickly and decisively without concern for court battles or compromises, so long as the party is loyal to the Prime Minister. This leads to the question: is this kind of clear line of responsibility to one party and one Prime Minister good or bad? On the plus side, it makes government very efficient; Margaret Thatcher could undo the social welfare system almost over night (just as Clement Atlee introduced it almost overnight after World War II), and parties cannot blame each other for problems -- it's clear who has power and who doesn't. This avoids the kind of gridlock which often ties up American politics.
Well, we've had six years of something moderately approaching the British situation. We have the same party holding the White House, Senate and House of Representatives. And, despite lack of party discipline in the American model, they have been rather loyal to President Bush. Yet the result has been a lack of investigation into murky and arguably illegal activities by the administration, a refusal to push on how the fiasco in Iraq unfolded, the passing of massive budget deficits alongside massive tax cuts, raising our total debt to nearly 70% of GDP (a decade ago it was 30% of GDP, and we were heading into surpluses). The trust of the American people in the President (and Congress) is near record lows, and most Americans think we are on the "wrong track."
While partisans might be tempted to say, "see, the Republicans can't govern," the political scientist in me sees an answer to the question of whether or not efficiency or gridlock is better. For Great Britain, efficiency works because of both the power of traditions in the British political system (witness Thatcher's willingness to step down at the end of 1990, despite winning a party leadership vote) and the way they vet their leaders -- they need to rise through the party demonstrating competence and loyalty, they need to show an understanding of and respect for British political tradition. In the US, while efficiency might work in the right circumstances with the right leaders, gridlock is probably better. Our political traditions are strong, but rest on the notion of separation of powers, meaning that when the separation is weak, the traditions are less effective.
In an ideal world, Congress would see its role as checking the President, regardless of party, but in the real world, that doesn't happen, and certainly hasn't happened until very recently (and still with a minority of members) in this administration. The inability of the Democratic party to check President Johnson during the Vietnam war lead to an internal party mini-collapse symbolized by the Chicago 1968 Democratic convention. It doesn't have to be an acrimonious gridlock either; during Reagan's Presidency the President could count on a majority from a mix of Republicans and conservative Democrats. Yet the conservative Democrats did not for the most part feel political loyalty to Reagan, and still functioned to try to check the power and scope of the Presidency.
We need "shared power," (and frankly, I think more should be shared with the states as well -- to students 'federal government' means 'centralized government,' a perversion of the definition) between parties. Not all the time. But two, maybe four years max of a single party in power in Congress and the Presidency is best. We also need more so-called moderates, like Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins (to tout Maine's horn here). They are each Republicans, but there is a small cadre of moderate Republicans and Democrats who still recognize that cooperation and compromise is the essence of America's political tradition. The spectacle of political campaigns have always had the partisan rhetoric, but traditionally in the marble halls of power in Washington DC the responsibility to govern transcended partisan rhetoric. Now the line has been blurred, and one party in power seemed more focused on implementing its abstract program and treating government like a campaign.
Alas, this may be part of a crisis of governance which, combined with a collapse in America's global position (something more and more people are starting to recognize -- the Iraq war's legacy is that it likely will mark the end of the period of American global dominance), may portend a difficulty future ahead.
April 21: It is interesting to watch the visit of China, the up and coming superpower, to the United States, the power in decline. China is succeeding because it has one thing that the United States has not shown much of lately: patience. In watching China's rise, with incredible economic growth for nearly three decades now, and increased geo-strategic importance, it should be clear to anyone who wants to dust off geo-political analysis that China is ascendant. Moreover, due to the rush to war against Iraq, and an almost irrational fear of Iran, the US has engaged and continues to engage in policies that weaken it, cost at least a trillion dollars, yield an exceedingly unpopular President (Bush's approval is now at 33% according to Fox Opinion Dynamics), and push away potential allies.
We are witnessing a classic transition of power, the United States is undeniably and perhaps irreversibly in decline. Yet most Americans don't seem to notice. We are caught up in the housing market, a myopic view of the Iraq war in terms of the Americans dead rather than long term cost of the consequences of that decision, and partisan politics. We get scared of "Islamic extremism" to the point that we risk creating a self-fulfilling prophecy by using violence and force which only seems to reaffirm what the extremists are saying -- under a wild fantasy that this will somehow spread democracy.
China, recognizing that Iran's leaders don't have a suicide wish, and that the foreign policy is the work of the Generals and Guardian Council (who have shown a patient but persistent desire to become a regional power), not President Ahmadinejad, whose wild rhetoric is focused on by the West, is creating a strategic partnership with Iran. They will block actions by the UN, they are developing oil deals, and they recognize that ultimately Iran can be an important strategic ally. The Russians as well recognize this, and are trying to position themselves as friends of Iran to avoid a Chinese-Iranian dominance of a region bordering the former USSR. In many ways, it's more dangerous for both China and Russia to be on Iran's bad side than America's.
In economics, China is in a position of strength. Our lifestyle now depends upon cheap Chinese goods. If they were taken from the market, prices would sky rocket. But China is diversifying its economic focus, and planning more internal consumption rather than pure export driven growth. That means they could weather a sharp decrease in sales to the US without sacrificing their economy, and may in fact purposefully engineer such a change in the future, much like how Japan went from mass produced cheap goods to being seen as a quality provider. Moreover, China's massive holding of dollars, it's extensive investment in American stocks, and the impact it could have on American currency by altering its exchange rate, could potentially weaken the US considerably. China doesn't have to it all at once, or even completely.
To be sure, China isn't there yet. And, there are dangers it will face, both internal. First, poverty levels are high in much of the country, and there is a fear that this could lead to instability; even with population control and massive economic growth China can't bring prosperity all at once to hundreds of millions. Second, the rising middle class has yet to demand political power. The 1989 "uprising" failed because it was mostly supported by intellectuals and students; the middle class was focused on getting rich. Within 20 years a new generation of the middle class will challenge the Communist party's hold on power. If Chinese institutions can't accommodate that challenge; if the Communist party tries to avoid true reform, then there could be an internal crisis that could slow or halt China's rise. In a worst case scenario, the impact of global warming alongside these issues could lead to internal collapse reminiscent of the old periods of imperial collapse in Chinese history.
The best path for the US at this point is to recognize that we are not the major world power we think we are. Our ability to shape events is limited. Iraq proves that; we can win a war but it is costly, and the aftermath may be worse for us. The way North Korea and Iran flaunt their disregard for US wishes (knowing there is little the US can do), and the decreased impact of American officials on policy of allies in Europe, Japan and South Korea show a true lack of influence and clout. The US has a lot of military power, but in an era of globalization, what good is it? And does it do more harm than good, tempting us to try to solve problems by force when force actually is likely to make things worse?
No, the US has to alter its foreign policy to deal with the reality that we are not a hegemonic power any more. We are not a uni-polar power. We are a major power with economic strength (though the increase in debt to near 70% of GDP, with future increases likely has weakened us there), but our interests rely on stability in the international system and economic and strategic partnerships. Otherwise, we may be telling our grandchildren years from now what it was like in the era of 'pax americana.' Hubris sinks great powers.
April 24: He's baaa-aack!
Osama Bin Laden issued a tape this weekend claiming the West is engaged in a crusade against Islam, calling on supporters to fight any UN presence in Sudan and urging support for Hamas. The response by Hamas and Sudan: quick distancing away from Bin Laden. Hamas claims to want good relations with the US, while the Sudanese government says it has "no interest" in any kind of crusade or war between the West and Islam.
The good news is that most of the Islamic world is not (nor have they ever been) supportive of the kind of tactics Bin Laden uses. Most Muslims do not support terrorism and would prefer some kind of peaceful relationship with the West. They are angry about American actions in Iraq, Islamic extremism is rallying larger numbers, but that isn't because of support for terror, but mostly a response to recent American policies. This shows a real possibility: if the US can somehow stabilize or leave Iraq, and at the same time ignore Iran, then the 'boogey man' of the "evil foreign invader" will be gone and there can be a real possibility of improved relations between the two "worlds." Hamas may be the only organization that can make peace with Israel and not lose legitimacy, there is a silver lining on all the dark clouds. Alas, American policy seems to be working against such a result, we seem not to have learned that force only strengthens anti-Americanism and yields instability.
There was something troubling about bin Laden's tape though. He specifically blamed average citizens for American and western policies, suggesting civilians share blame with the government. Bin Laden may be desperate to control the "culture war" between West and Islam which he (and many Americans who are unwitting allies to bin Laden's cause) so fervently want. With support and relevance dwindling, his only recourse would be to do something dramatic to gain the upper land. Al qaeda has proven itself to be patient; in a weird way this time of apparent weakness might mean bin Laden is more dangerous than ever.
Consider: it was a small group in a relatively small organization that pulled off 9-11. They did not nor do they now represent any large chunk of the Muslim world, but their act nonetheless inspired a kind of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim paranoia that in extreme cases exhibits the kind of bigotry the Nazis had towards the Jews. Their act led the US to launch two wars, go from budget surpluses to massive deficits, divide the country, get the US enmeshed in a situation in Iraq which is an utter disaster, and confront Iran with wild rhetoric on both sides and no good options. They have weakened the West, they have damaged the US -- not so much by the rather minor attack on 9-11 (we have done much more damage to Iraq and Afghanistan with our wars) but with how they have caused us to react in ways that weaken us and aid the cause of Islamic extremism. If they can pull off another attack (perhaps with nukes?) then they have to figure that America's reaction will help invigorate anti-Western attitudes and again goad the US into self-defeating actions. Moreover, Bin Laden and his clique may believe that such a bold act will catapult them into a leadership role in their "culture war."
Ultimately, Bin Laden will fail. His delusions are reminiscent of Timothy McVeigh's. McVeigh believed his terror act would cause Americans to rise up against the "repressive state." The Muslim world does not want a theocratic fundamentalist state of the kind Bin Laden would create. Modernism has already permeated the Arab (and definitely the Persian) mind, and there is no going back. The question is whether or not the process will bring down the United States and create a period of violence and economic turmoil, or if Bin Laden and the extremists can be marginalized and eliminated without the region going through their 'wars of modernization.' So far our policies are hurting, not helping the effort to deal with this peacefully. That needs to change.
April 25: The Hecticity Culture
NPR had an interesting report this morning about how the new generation of professionals are unwilling to do what the last generation did in terms of working 50 to 70 hour weeks in top positions at major corporations, accounting firms and law firms. Companies are worried about filling leadership roles when the current generation retires, or to replace current management staff as they 'move up the ladder.' People want more of an ability to work from home, they want to work fewer hours, they want more flexibility, and their willing to give up pay to get it. In short, quality of life trumps raw ambition and accumulation.
One can only hope this report is accurate. While the Europeans long ago embraced the notion that it doesn't really pay to live in a world of material prosperity and wealth if you aren't able to enjoy it, the American work force has been working longer hours and sacrificing family time and personal time in order to compete for the best jobs and the best pay. The result has been an insane culture of hecticity. Hecticity? Yes it's a word -- and has been one now for thirty seconds. I just coined it (and added it to my spell check dictionary). Hecticity is the constant stress and hectic pace of life, where people go from task to task, getting things done, taking care of mini-crises and problems, without time to really sit back and reflect.
Hecticity is a self-imposed condition, but most people don't recognize it as such. The culture pushes us towards hecticity. In the workplace people won't get promoted or get raises if they don't compete. If you don't get a raise or get promoted, you can't get all that cool stuff that advertisers convince us is absolutely necessary for our happiness. Worse, people fear failure, and believe staying on top of things and being constantly busy is the only way to assure failure is avoided.
That's perhaps the worst side effect of hecticity. People don't have time to reflect on their lives, think about what is truly important to them, and enjoy life. A person suffering from hecticity has a life defined by schedules and tasks. Exhausted at the end of the day, and perhaps afraid to truly confront the inner self that needs a change, television or maybe a book is the escape. When not engaged in the hectic and stressful pace of the modern world, one chooses to escape into a film or story. Personal reflection is avoided; it's too painful. One knows "yeah, I'm too busy, I need a break," but people don't want to confront what it would take to do that (it would require rejecting hecticity), and seriously consider major changes in life style and values. Hecticity can be comfortable, it gives you something to do, an excuse not to reflect.
For my generation, it's probably too late. Those who are caught up in the hecticity culture will find it hard to break away. But it's heartening that the new generation of young workers recognize this problem and are rebelling against it. One only hopes that the tools that enable hecticity (cell phones, palm pilots, etc.) are kept under control, lest they control us. It is a shame that in a society where we have so much convenience, luxury and comfort -- and so many toys -- too many of the brightest and most successful people zip through life without enjoying the opportunities they have, too caught up in the hectic pace of the modern world. (Steven Colbert, if you read my blog, I think "hecticity" would be a good "WORD." )
April 26: Good vs. Evil?
Max Boot in the LA Times claims that the media should portray the current conflict in Iraq as a struggle of good vs. evil. He decries journalistic reporting of CIA secret prisons and the like as somehow aiding the terrorists. Yet while he apparently is comfortable in the "we are good, they are evil, anything we do is justified" mentality, one has to wonder if he's not going down a slippery slope to embracing evil. Fascism as an ideology is built on irrationality, nationalism, fear and militarism. We are not immune to drifting that way, nor will most people recognize the trend since most people associate fascism as a bleating Hitler screaming at the crowds or blatant racism. Are we drifting that way now?
Consider: CIA secret detention for the use of techniques which likely include torture violates what our country is about. It presumes guilt, and treats humans as objects to use just in case they might have information that is useful to us. How can that be good? Is not outing evil something good? Consider as well: the US has become an aggressive power, launching numerous wars including two (Kosovo and Iraq 2003) in direct contradiction to the will of the United Nations Security Council. Now there is talk about strikes against Iran which even our British allies have called an "insane" idea for an imagined threat which may some day exist. Even the nuclear option is on the table.
Meanwhile in Iraq we seem to be building permanent bases, have destroyed the country's infrastructure and are attempting to control its development after deposing Saddam (which was done by April 2003 -- three years ago). Tens of thousands of Iraqis have been killed either by the US directly or indirectly by the chaos we've initiated. Women's rights are less than under Saddam, as well as the Iraqi standard of living. Under Saddam there was repression, but especially by 2003 he had limited power. Now there is complete insecurity and fear throughout the country. All this might have been avoided if we had not supported Saddam in the eighties and looked the other way when he first used chemical weapons in the eighties.
In short, we launch wars of aggression, we support evil when it suits us, then use that same evil as an excuse to conquer when we change our mind. We build up propagandistic justifications for offensive war when it suits us, but ignore genocides and dictatorial regimes at other times. We claim we are trying to bring western democracy to the world, when it took us and the Europeans centuries to build it to the standards we now set -- after all, we had slavery, women couldn't vote, and there weren't equal rights for minorities in much of our democratic development. We claim to support international standards of human rights, but ignore international law when it suits us. We seem to think we have the right on the basis of who we are to do whatever we want in the international system, so long as we can develop a rationalization that someone or some state may be a threat or may be evil.
We have become a militarist society, not thinking about the horror of war as people rationalize it. The right wing has developed a discourse of power that treats military power as something noble and honorable, with the cost in human terms as utterly irrelevant. People are afraid to speak out against war because they'll be accused of not supporting the troops. Even most of those who oppose the war do so by looking at American loses and American costs, not the real impact of the war on people over there. The opposition Democrats tend to criticize how the war is handled, not the idea of launching offensive war.
Perhaps we're an unwitting force for evil in the world, not noticing the damage we're doing because of the rationalizations we make, or the wild rhetoric of opponents like Ahmadinejad or Bin Laden. Just because Bin Laden may have done evil, doesn't mean anything we do is good. Two evils do not make a good. It's something we need to think about as we go down this path, but everything in our culture pushes us away from confronting those hard realities. We're distracted by our material wants, pop culture focuses us on sexy trails and reality TV, and the rationalization of the war is sold in sound bites and by glib talking pundits who jerk emotional chains and create a sense of, well, good vs. evil.
Am I overstating the problem? Perhaps. But if we go down that slippery slope to justifying anything we do, and assuming that nothing we do can be evil, and that we are immune to fascism, we may well sacrifice our Republic -- both in terms of the values it stands for, and in terms of its material well being.
April 28: The end of Cheap Oil
(An aside: as I write this I'm listening to the online version of Neil Young's just released album Living With War. Pretty powerful. Restless Consumer is really good.)
I remember back in the late nineties filling my tank with gas that cost 80 cents a gallon. At that time I was disappointed I didn't have a few thousand extra dollars to invest, because I knew that it was only a matter of time before that kind of cheap oil disappeared, and a number of industries would benefit greatly from higher oil costs. By the late nineties the low oil and gas prices were fueling an economic boom. When adjusted for inflation the prices were as low if not lower than back in the sixties before the first energy crisis. I still remember my mom driving her convertible to the station, asking for "3 dollars worth of premium please," and then waiting as the attendant filled her tank, checked her oil, and cleaned the windshield.
The impact of oil on the economy and geopolitics is hard to overstate. Everything from third world debt to global economic conditions is a result of the role of oil in the economy. The power of Iran, the importance of the Mideast, and the inability of corrupt, authoritarian governments to reform is related to oil. In fact, it's not clear that massive oil revenues are a blessing for a state; the money oil brings in usually creates the perfect environment for massive corruption, and a temptation along with the means for those in government to use force to stay in power. It helps the elites in oil rich states; the impact on publics is unclear.
So what does it mean now that the era of cheap oil is over. The low prices of the eighties and nineties were caused by the fact the oil crises of the seventies artificially raised prices to the point that it provoked an oil glut, with OPEC states trying to compensate for falling prices by cheating on their quotas. And, to be sure, $75 a barrel is partially a response to problems with Iran, unrest in Nigeria, and concerns about Venezuela. But even without those, the price would be high, and it will never (except perhaps briefly) get down to the $15 to $20 barrel point it was at, or even the long time OPEC target of $25 a barrel. Reason: demand. Demand from China, India and other third world states has been increasing dramatically. The oil price rise since 2000 has not just been a response to terrorism, but based on the law of supply and demand.
Can supply increase? No, at least no time soon, and almost certainly not in a manner that can bring prices down. Can demand decrease? Sure -- recession in the US or China would provide short term relief, then the lower oil prices would help the recession end and demand would rise again. A sudden reduction in tensions through out the oil world might also relieve the 'risk bonus' attached to the price of oil. An Iranian-American friendship treaty, a hug between Hugo Chavez and President Bush, and Iraqi Sunni and Shi'ites singing "Kumbaiya my allah" around a camp fire would bring oil closer to a true market price. But things could get worse rather than better as well.
So what does this mean? Are we set up for a major economic meltdown? Lately people have been optimistic about the US economy as its growth rate remains high, and unemployment low. But it's come at a price -- our debt has doubled to 70% of our GDP. Think of that -- if you manage to improve your lifestyle by increasing your credit card debt, is that really something to celebrate?
(Aside again: "Shock and Awe" is also a really great cut...I have to get this thing on CD when it comes out!)
I'll have to continue this topic later, I'm going to just enjoy the rest of this album and then head to a full faculty meeting. Have a good weekend -- more on oil sometime next week (unless I get distracted...like I'm being today by Neil Young...)